The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
456.
On 3 February,
just before the election results were announced, the JIC
assessed
the nature
and strength of insurgents in Iraq, the threat they posed and the
response of
both the
ISF and the MNF-I.247
It
judged:
“The scale
and intensity of the Sunni insurgency continues to put at risk
the
achievement
of a unified and democratic Iraq. In Sunni areas the military
campaign
is not
containing the insurgency … While the political process offers an
opportunity
to detach
some insurgents from the hard core, a significant Sunni insurgency
will
continue
through 2005 and beyond.
“Foreign
jihadists continue to form a small minority of insurgents, but have
been
responsible
for many of the most serious attacks. However, al-Zarqawi’s
violent
Islamist
message, including his rejection of democracy, is not accepted by
most
Iraqis –
including by some Sunni Arab insurgents.
“Shia
insurgents are largely dormant. The threat of some Shia violence,
however,
will
persist …
“Insurgents
are not unified among the Sunni or nationally, although they
have
a common
enemy: the MNF and those Iraqis associated with supporting
the
‘occupation’.
This has led to possibly increasing local cooperation between
some
groups,
notably foreign jihadists and Iraqi Sunni Arabs.”
457.
The JIC judged
that:
“… the
military campaign is not effectively containing the insurgency in
Sunni areas.
Law and
order, the pace of economic reconstruction, the availability of
jobs and
general
quality of life have not matched expectation … Sunni ‘hearts and
minds’ are
being
lost.”
458.
The JIC
reported that there had been around 300 security incidents on
election day
itself,
which had killed 30 Iraqis, but “the effect on the elections was
not as significant as
had been
feared or as al-Zarqawi and others had threatened”.
459.
On 3 February,
Mr Straw told Cabinet that the elections had gone “better
than
anticipated”,
which “provided an opportunity to shift the debate about Iraq”. The
ISF had
also
performed better than had been expected.248
460.
Mr Chaplin
told the Inquiry that substantial numbers of Sunni Arabs boycotted
the
election,
and those who voted did so largely on sectarian
lines.249
He judged
that there
were a
number of reasons why Sunnis felt unable to
participate:
“One was
security; another was I think they hoped until quite late on that
the
elections
wouldn’t take place because of insecurity, and I think they felt
very sore
247
JIC
Assessment, 3 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency’.
248
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 February 2005.
249
Public
hearing, 7 December 2009, pages 12-13.
468