14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
443.
Lt Gen Dutton
told the Inquiry that less time was devoted to SSR because of
the
need for
greater force protection. Describing how the threat restricted
movements in the
second half
of his tour, he said:
“… my
vehicles never left the compound, we did all movement by air, or if
the
vehicles
did move, they were in convoys protected by armoured
vehicles.”233
444.
Lieutenant
General John Cooper, GOC MND(SE) from December 2005 to
June
2006, told
the Inquiry that, when he arrived in MND(SE), “on the security
side, everything
was
containable but there was this sense of increasing military
activity, particularly from
[JAM]”.234
The
introduction of PIR EFPs “had an impact on lower level tactical
issues”.
That was an
“issue with which we could deal, but it was sometimes
unpleasant”.
445.
Lt Gen Cooper
stated that the response from the UK’s “scientific and
defence
community
was very good, both in terms of personal equipment and
vehicles”.
446.
In a statement
to the Inquiry, Assistant Chief Constable Colin Smith, Chief
Police
Adviser
Iraq from May 2005 to April 2006, wrote:
“The
‘deteriorating’ security situation had a major influence on ability
to progress
development
plans. As attacks increased in MND(SE) movement became difficult
…
Movement of
CivPol [civilian police] became a further issue. As security
deteriorated
CivPol
officers needed increasingly to be escorted by substantial military
resources
(Warrior
Armoured Vehicles and helicopters). Their priority however was
increasingly
lowered by
the military … This caused serious difficulties in moving between
sites
to attend
meetings with staff often stranded overnight in various locations
without
transport.
It was not uncommon for officers to spend 2 or 3 days at the Basra
APOD
[aerial
point of departure] awaiting movement. Similar problems existed in
Baghdad
with an FCO
‘fly only’ policy supported by insufficient helicopter
resources.
“I do not
criticise the military for this situation. As security and
‘war‑fighting’ became
a greater
priority, movement of civilians became a lesser
priority.”235
447.
Speaking to
the Inquiry about his duty of care to UK police officers in
Iraq,
CC Kernaghan
said that he had not wanted his officers to travel in Snatch
Land
Rovers.236
He said he
“was quite clear that Snatch Land Rovers posed an
unacceptable
risk”. CC
Kernaghan added that this was not meant as a criticism of general
officers who
deployed
the military in Snatch vehicles because: “They had no alternative.
You do what
you do with
what you have got.”
233
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 18.
234
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 17‑18.
235
Statement,
25 June 2010, pages 7‑8.
236
Public
hearing, 23 July 2010, page 50.
75