The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
569.
The Chiefs of
Staff also agreed that the UK should adopt the Joint
Commission
approach to
local government proposed by Lt Gen Reith in the draft
Operational
Concept.
570.
Adm Boyce
directed that the draft Operational Concept be amended to reflect
the
discussion.
It should also be circulated to the Chiefs of Staff and UK
representatives in
the
Pentagon and CENTCOM “for use as a vehicle to engage the
US”.
571.
Adm Boyce also
repeated his 26 March request that Mr Lee prepare
briefing
on Phase
IV progress for Mr Hoon.
572.
The Inquiry
has not seen any record of whether or how the draft
Operational
Concept was
used by UK representatives in the Pentagon and
CENTCOM.
573.
Sir David
Manning was advised on 31 March that there was “likely to
be
a serious
shortfall in military forces for Phase IV and building a coalition
to
undertake
some of these operations is complicated by the absence of a
UNSCR”.
574.
The Cabinet
Office reported to Sir David Manning on 31 March:
“There was
some discussion [at the Chiefs of Staff meeting] of whether we
should
agree to
the informal US request to take on four provinces. This would
almost
certainly
require more than the medium level of force that the MOD intend to
leave
behind in
Iraq from the autumn. The difficulty is that there is likely to be
a serious
shortfall
in military forces for Phase IV and building a coalition to
undertake some of
these
operations is complicated by the absence of a UNSCR … You might
want to
encourage
MOD to share its thinking on force sizes, perhaps at COBR(R)
initially,
once it has
crystallised. In the meantime there is a danger of a rising
expectation
in
Washington that we’ll be able to contribute more than we can manage
in
575.
In early
April, Ministers were advised that ORHA was planning to
administer
the whole
of Iraq and it would therefore not be feasible for 1 (UK) Div to
operate
autonomously
in the UK AOR.
576.
Concerns
were expressed about the implications, in those
circumstances,
of
differences between US and UK interpretations of the rights and
obligations
of Occupying
Powers.
577.
On 31 March,
Mr Huw Llewellyn, an FCO Legal Counsellor, reported
to
Mr Dominick
Chilcott, Head of the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), that UK military
lawyers
based in
Kuwait were becoming alarmed at ORHA’s activities.344
ORHA had
issued three
343
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COS meeting – Monday 31
March 2003’.
344
Minute
Llewellyn to Chilcott, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA: Current
Activity’.
102