9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
9 percent
have proper body armour; only 30 percent of the required vehicles
are in
place.
Apparently the logjam on resources and equipment is now broken. But
it will
take time.
And the Iraqi Army isn’t really started yet.
“All of
this is now urgent.”
1100.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary suggested that he should discuss the plan
outlined in
his Note to
“draw together various key strands of work (Iraq, WMD, Afghanistan,
MEPP)
into a
coherent strategy with a clear timetable into the autumn” with
President Bush on
1101.
In mid-June,
the JIC assessed the threat posed by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi.628
It concluded
that:
“I.
Al-Zarqawi
is now second only to Bin Laden as an inspirational figure in
the
Islamist
extremist world. His networks have proved resilient and if he is
killed or
captured
other leaders will emerge.
II.
Islamist terrorists have been responsible for a number of major
suicide attacks in
Iraq, and
al-Zarqawi has been behind many of them.
III.
Other significant but less well-publicised Islamist terrorist
groups are conducting
similar
attacks against similar targets. But his actions and words have
given
al‑Zarqawi
an unrivalled prominence as the key jihadist leader in
Iraq.
IV. It
is not clear whether al-Zarqawi is a member of Al Qaida. He has
close links
with the
leadership, but maintains his independence.
V. His
strategy in Iraq is to destabilise the country by fomenting civil
war, and
eventually
to establish a Sunni Islamist state – and a safe haven from
which
Islamist
terrorists can pursue the jihad. In pursuing this strategy he will
seek to
intensify
attacks in the lead up to the handover of power and beyond,
targeting
Americans,
British, Kurds, Shia and other Iraqis seen as supporting the
Coalition
and the new
Iraqi government.”
1102.
On 17 June,
Mr Blair told Cabinet that the Iraqi people were
beginning
to realise
that terrorist attacks were not against the Coalition, but rather
against Iraq
and its
people.629
He
suggested that this should result in a reduction in support
for
terrorist
activity.
1103.
Gen Walker
told the AHMGIR on the same date that there had been a
marginal
improvement
in the security situation and that incidents in MND(SE) were down
by
20
percent.630
There
continued to be targeted attacks by militants, using
increasingly
sophisticated
tactics.
627
Minute
Quarrey to Blair, 22 June 2004, ‘VTC with President Bush, 22
June’.
628
JIC
Assessment, 16 June 2004, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from
Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’.
629
Cabinet
Conclusions, 17 June 2004.
630
Minutes, 17
June 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
389