4.4 | The
search for WMD
508.
In his
unclassified testimony to Congress on 2 October, Dr Kay
emphasised that
the Interim
Report was a “snapshot” after the ISG’s first three months’
work.280
It
was
“far too
early” to reach definitive conclusions and in some areas that goal
might never
be reached.
509.
Dr Kay stated
that the ISG had “not yet found stocks of weapons”, but nor was
it
“yet at the
point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks
do not
exist or
that they existed before the war”. Search efforts were being
hindered by six main
factors:
•
deception
and denial were built into each Iraqi WMD programme;
•
there had
been deliberate dispersal and destruction of material
and
documentation;
•
looting,
some of it systematic and deliberate;
•
some WMD
personnel had left Iraq immediately before and during the
conflict;
•
any weapons
or material were likely to be small and difficult to find;
and
•
the
environment in Iraq was “far from permissive”.
510.
Dr Kay stated
that the ISG had discovered “dozens of WMD-related
program
activities
and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the
United
Nations
during the inspection that began in late 2002”, and listed
examples.
511.
Dr Kay
explained that, although he had resisted drawing conclusions in the
Interim
Report, a
number of things had become clearer as a result of the ISG’s
work:
•
Saddam
Hussein “had not given up his aspirations and intentions to
continue to
acquire
weapons of mass destruction”.
•
There were
“well advanced, but undeclared, ongoing activities” in the area
of
delivery
systems that “would have resulted in the production of missiles
with
ranges up
to 1,000km” if Operation Iraqi Freedom had not
intervened.
•
The ISG was
confident that there had been ongoing clandestine CBW
research
and
development activities embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence
Service.
512.
Discussion of
the Interim Report at the JIC Sub-Committee on
Iraq/WMD
on
3 October focused on media coverage.281
The
response from UK defence
correspondents
had been encouraging and there were no plans for Mr Blair to
comment
publicly.
The meeting judged that press interest in the UK was likely to die
down.
513.
The meeting
concluded that there was “no benefit in producing a JIC
Assessment”
of the
Interim Report, but a “community wide analysis” should be made
through a
CIG meeting.
280
Central
Intelligence Agency, 2 October 2003, Statement
by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report
on the
Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).
281
Minutes,
3 October 2003, JIC Sub-Committee on IRAQ/WMD
meeting.
527