The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
backdrop is growing US/European mutual disenchantment. This puts
the UK
in an
awkward spot … The Europeans are seen as burying their heads in the
sand,
refusing to
face up to an international threat which only the US, and maybe the
UK,
have the
guts and capability to tackle …
“Looking at
this solely as an issue of unilateralism v. multilateralism does
not capture
the
complexity of American attitudes … For all their brave talk, the
Americans know
perfectly
well that they are better off with capable allies than not
…
“War-fighting
considerations are an insufficient guide to handling the next phase
in
combating
terrorism … The task for the next few months is to demonstrate to
the
Americans
that it is possible and desirable to reconcile the pursuit of the
mission
with the
concerns of the main coalition partners. This may call for some
very
plain
speaking in private. But we are just about the only foreigners to
whom the
Administration
consistently listens.
“So the
visit to London next month of the Vice President and that of the
Prime
Minister to
the US in April assume even greater importance than
usual.”
38.
Assessing the
climate in Washington on 13 February, Sir Christopher
Meyer
reported
that President Bush’s speech had “quickened the drumbeat on Iraq”
and
commentators
were “drawing the conclusion that military action is now
inevitable”.13
39.
Drawing
together the views the Embassy and senior visitors had heard over
the last
couple of
weeks, Sir Christopher wrote:
“The line
that no decision has been taken … may still formally be correct.
But there
are few
parts of the Administration that see any alternative to US action –
the real
questions
now are what, when, and (from our point of view) how much
international
legitimacy
the US will seek to build …
“As ever,
the hawks’ agenda is easiest to discern. They feel they have won
the
argument
over whether US action is needed …
“The
military, meanwhile, continue to look at their plans in expectation
that they will
be asked to
take on a major operation in Iraq this year (this is … what lies
behind
CENTCOM’s
[US Central Command] reluctance to provide back-up to an
expanded
ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] in Afghanistan) … But
they remain
very
worried about the ideas being pushed by DoD [Department of Defense]
civilian
hawks,
above all the perception that this would be easy to do quickly
…
“The
perception that key regional states are now essentially on board …
now
appears to
have spread across the Administration … officials and pundits
alike
speculate
that Cheney’s visit will be aimed at nailing the necessary
support.
13
Telegram
197 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2002, ‘US/IRAQ: The
Momentum Builds’.
394