The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“an alternative legal base i.e. that action was necessary to prevent an overwhelming

humanitarian catastrophe (by analogy with the 1991 action in Northern Iraq to help the

Kurds)”. Mr Ricketts commented:

“… that would not be credible grounds for action this time. So far as I can see, failure

to get a second resolution would leave us with no plausible legal basis.”

367. In a manuscript comment in the margin of Mr Ricketts’ minute, Sir David Manning

wrote: “What about the reference in OP1 to ‘material breach’?”126

368. It is not clear whether Sir David had seen the minute before his conversation

with Dr Rice.

369. On 4 October, Sir David Manning reported that the US Administration was not yet

willing to discuss detailed draft texts with the French.127 Secretary Powell would discuss

“concepts” with Mr de Villepin. The instinct was to move cautiously and to take time to

see if agreement was possible. The US was also considering changes to the proposed

text of OP10.

370. In his conversation with Mr de Villepin on 4 October, Mr Straw stated that: we had

to find out the extent of the problem with Iraq and its WMD by getting the inspectors

back.128 We had got as far as we had with the Iraqis by threatening force. We would

prefer to resolve the problem peacefully. If this was not possible we would use force.

371. Mr Straw and Mr de Villepin agreed officials should discuss.

372. Mr Straw spoke twice to Secretary Powell on 4 October. In the second

conversation he told Secretary Powell that there was “no parallel” with the Kosovo

model.129

373. FCO Legal Advisers continued to voice concerns about the absence of a

clear statement from the Security Council reviving the authority for the use of

force, and that Lord Goldsmith’s views would be needed once the language in

the draft resolution on that point had been firmed up.

374. On 4 October, in a minute copied to Sir Jeremy Greenstock among others, Mr John

Grainger, FCO Legal Counsellor, expressed concerns that the current draft resolution

126 Manuscript comment Manning on Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 3 October 2002,

‘Iraq: Resolutions: The “Kosovo Option”’.

127 Letter Manning to McDonald, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

128 Telegram 213 FCO to Paris, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with French

Foreign Minister, 4 October’.

129 Telegram 521 FCO London to Washington, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation

with US Secretary of State, 4 October’.

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