The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
350.
The first
attack where an EFP was detonated using Passive Infra Red
(PIR)
technology
took place in MND(SE) on 29 May, when Lance Corporal Alan
Brackenbury
was killed
while travelling in a Land Rover south of al‑Amara.173
351.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 1 June, Gen Walker directed Major
General
Peter Wall,
Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations), to conduct an
analysis of the
incident
and inform the Chiefs of Staff of the lessons identified,
particularly with regard
to
countermeasures, and “to take a view on the current operating
procedures and the
relative
merits of protected/unprotected vehicles”.174
352.
Maj Gen Wall
submitted his analysis to the Chiefs of Staff on 6
June.175
He
wrote
that the
attacked vehicle was leading a three vehicle patrol of unprotected
Wolf Land
Rovers. It
was assessed that a Snatch Land Rover would not have offered
greater
protection
or prevented LCpl Brackenbury’s injuries.
353.
Addressing the
use of Snatch, Maj Gen Wall wrote:
“Operating
procedures are based on the threat, the task, the terrain and force
profile.
Threat and
mobility are the key factors in assessing the relative merits of
deploying
Snatch or
TUM [Wolf Land Rover]. Whilst there is no formal limitation on the
use of
Snatch …
TUM is usually preferred for cross country use in rural areas … and
this
is the
standard operating procedure. There is insufficient Snatch in
theatre for its
general use
outside the urban areas …”
354.
Maj Gen Wall
added that Maj Gen Riley had “adopted a more protective
posture”
following
the recent IED attacks and that “all road movement within the
province” was
being
conducted in Snatch or armoured vehicles – Warrior and
CVR(T).
355.
In his final
report as GOC MND(SE), Maj Gen Riley wrote that his
“overriding
concern”
was the “continuing IED attacks in Maysan”, where:
“… patrols
now use Warriors to over‑watch the armoured Land Rovers in
order
to give
additional protection. This takes careful explaining to the local
population
who
remember the use of Warriors to defeat last summer’s JAM [Jaysh
al‑Mahdi]
356.
Some of the
key lessons Maj Gen Riley identified in a separate report
on 10 June
were:
•
“More
training on Snatch and other UOR requirements, and the development
of
basic
infantry skills, must be factored into any pre‑deployment
training.”
173
GOV.UK, 29
May 2005, Death of
British Servicemen in Iraq – Lance Corporal Alan
Brackenbury.
PIR reference
provided in Minute DJC to PS/SofS, 26 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Pre‑detonation of Passive Infra
Red
Initiated Roadside Bombs’.
174
Minutes, 1
June 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
175
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 6 June 2005, ‘Analysis of Fatal IED Attack
Against UK Forces in Iraq
on 29 May
05’.
176
Minute
Riley, 8 June 2005, GOC MND(SE) Weekly Report.
62