3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
502.
Sir David
told Mr Blair that Dr Rice had been “pretty receptive to
his arguments”.
President
Bush was “not currently planning to say anything about a resolution
or
inspection”.
The speech made:
“… a strong
and persuasive case about the horrors of Saddam and his
regime,
but cannot
bring itself to say that, in dealing with this threat, we must have
another
UN
resolution and further inspections. Arguably, this is implicit. But
it would be far
better in
winning hearts and minds if Bush made it explicit, and did not
leave it to
Colin
Powell to make the UN case afterwards …”
503.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that Mr Blair would want to talk to
President Bush before the
speech.
504.
Sir David
commented to Mr Blair:
“There is
little doubt that the Cheney counter‑attack, with its wilful
distortion of what
you said at
Camp David, will be sustained right up to the moment that Bush
mounts
the UN
rostrum. Despite my two conversations with Condi … it would still
be very
valuable if
you could speak to Bush yourself.”
505.
Although
Sir David’s minutes were apparently sent only to addressees
within
No.10,
copies were in the papers sent to the Inquiry from the Private
Offices of
Sir Michael
Jay and Mr Straw.
506.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Mr Annan on 10 September that the UK wanted
to
avoid the
use of military force.
507.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Mr Annan on 10 September that there had
been
“intensive
discussions” between the US and UK.155
“The
priority for the UK was to
make the UN
route work if at all possible and to avoid the use of military
force.” But
the problem
of WMD in Iraq “must be dealt with”. Sir Jeremy predicted that
there was
work to be
done, including between capitals, before a debate could be launched
in the
Security
Council.
508.
Sir Jeremy
and Mr Annan also discussed Iraq’s position, including a
suggestion
that
Mr Tariq Aziz had been “casting around for a way out, willing
to contemplate the
return of
inspectors but apparently genuinely puzzled as to how this could
help Iraq if the
inspectors
were likely to be cover for spies to indicate Iraqi military
targets”. Mr Annan
said he had
assured Mr Aziz of Dr Blix’s professionalism and
independence.
509.
Sir Jeremy
commented that Mr Annan was aware that Iraq would not
be
contemplating
any moves at all without the threat of military
action.
510.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that there was still debate in
Washington
about the
UK’s position on the need for inspectors.
155
Telegram
1611 UKMIS New York to FCO, 10 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Annan’.
179