The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
867.
Better
planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq would
not
necessarily
have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and
2009.
It would
not have been possible for the UK to prepare for every eventuality.
Better
plans and
preparation could have mitigated some of the risks to which the UK
and Iraq
were
exposed between 2003 and 2009 and increased the likelihood of
achieving the
outcomes
desired by the UK and the Iraqi people.
868.
From late
2003, successive reviews of the UK’s approach to
post‑conflict
reconstruction,
later expanded to include the broader concept of stabilisation,
resulted
in a series
of changes to the UK’s approach to post‑conflict operations.
Despite those
changes,
many of the shortcomings that characterised the UK Government’s
approach to
pre‑conflict
planning and preparation in 2002 and early 2003 persisted after the
invasion.
869.
The UK
Government’s new strategic framework for stabilisation, the
new
machinery
for inter‑departmental co‑ordination and the enhanced resources
now
available
for stabilisation operations continue to evolve. If future changes
are to increase
the
effectiveness of UK operations, they must address the lessons for
planning,
preparation
and implementation derived from the Iraq experience.
870.
The lessons
identified by the Inquiry apply to both the planning and
preparation
for
post‑conflict operations, of which reconstruction is a major but
not the sole
component,
and to post‑conflict operations themselves.
871.
Analysis of
the available material must draw on multiple perspectives,
reflect
dissenting
views, identify risk – including that associated with any gaps in
knowledge –
and
consider a range of options.
872.
Information
must be shared as widely across departments as is necessary
to
support
that approach.
873.
Gathering
information and analysis of the nature and scale of the potential
task
should be
systematic and as thorough as possible, and should capture the
views and
aspirations
of local communities.
874.
Plans derived
from that analysis should:
•
incorporate
a range of options appropriate to different
contingencies;
•
reflect a
realistic assessment of UK (and partners’) resources and
capabilities;
•
integrate
civilian and military objectives and capabilities in support of a
single
UK strategy;
•
be exposed
to scrutiny and challenge at Ministerial, senior official and
expert
level;
•
be reviewed
regularly and, if the strategic context, risk profile or projected
cost
changes
significantly, be revised.
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