3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
Saddam
would be prepared to use CBW”. Saddam “had not taken the final
opportunity
afforded to
him by … 1441”.
968.
Mr Ehrman
set out the UK difficulties with the tripartite
French/German/Russian
proposal
and stated that the UK/US/Spanish resolution “would increase
pressure on
Iraq”.
There was still a chance for Iraq to take radical action to disarm
and the resolution
“was the
only remaining route to peaceful disarmament”.
969.
In the
separate meeting with a senior MFA official, Mr Ehrman had
repeated
the
briefing and emphasised the importance of preserving international
order and
international
law. The UK had made great efforts in persuading the US that it
should
use the
UN route; that “should not now be lost”.299
970.
Mr Hum
advised that China had “appreciated” the UK’s willingness to share
its
assessments;
but that “if a vote occurred today, I have little doubt they would
abstain”.
971.
Baroness
Amos advised on 4 March that Angola, Cameroon and Guinea
were
not yet
ready to commit to a “yes vote” and had emphasised the need for
P5 unity.
972.
Following a
visit for discussions with the Presidents of Angola, Cameroon
and
Guinea,
Baroness Amos reported to Mr Straw that:
“… our
approach to the visits was right with a focus on our strong
relationship with
Africa …
our desire to work with each of the countries in partnership and to
share
intelligence
information available to us about the situation in Iraq
…
“All three
listened carefully to our arguments, in particular the need to keep
the
UN in
control of events, to keep the US engaged in multilateral fora and
that the
harassment
and intimidation faced by the weapons inspectors made a
nonsense
of a
longer inspection regime.”300
973.
Baroness Amos
wrote: “I think we won the argument”; and that:
“… it might
be possible to secure the votes. But – as expected – none of the
three
were
prepared to commit themselves explicitly to a yes vote … They would
all much
prefer to
abstain than have to choose between us and the US on the one
hand
and France
and Africa on the other. I was struck by the same argument from
all
three, the
importance of unity amongst the P5 … and the need for a majority in
the
Security Council
…”
974.
Baroness Amos
cautioned that the UK and US would need to stay in
close
touch
to ensure that lobbying was complementary and to avoid being
perceived to be
harassing
the African members of the Security Council. In addition, “some of
what is
299
Telegram 90
Beijing to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Lobbying the
Chinese’.
300
Minute Amos
to Foreign Secretary, 4 March 2003, [untitled].
355