9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
In
response, the UK increased the rank of the SBMR-I who would also
serve as
deputy commander.
Lieutenant
General John McColl deployed in April 2004 and served as both
SBMR-I and
the deputy
commander in first CJTF-7 and subsequently MNF-I until October
2004.551
A further
three-star military command was established underneath MNF-I: the
Multi-
National
Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). This was headed by a US three-star General,
Lieutenant
General
Thomas Metz.552
The deputy
commander was a two-star British officer. Under the
new
structures, divisional commanders reported to Lt Gen
Metz.
A second
three-star headquarters was created to focus on security sector
reform: Multi-
National
Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). From June 2004 it was
headed
by another
US three-star officer, Lieutenant General David Petraeus. The
Coalition Military
Assistance
and Training Team (CMATT) and its newly created policing
equivalent, the
Coalition
Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT), reported to Lt Gen
Petraeus.
965.
Mr Brahimi
met Mr Blair at Chequers on 3 May.553
966.
In discussion,
Mr Brahimi agreed that security in Iraq was key, observing
that it was
difficult
to understand in what proportions the insurgency was made up of
foreigners,
Saddam
Hussein loyalists and Iraqi nationalists.
967.
Mr Brahimi
thought that the UN’s role would be focused on the electoral
process
after 30
June. Sir Nigel Sheinwald indicated that the UK envisaged a
“substantial role
for the UN”
working to co-ordinate reconstruction as well as in Iraqi
ministries and
as a
political guide to the Interim Government. During his discussion
with Mr Straw,
Mr Brahimi
indicated that he thought the UN had already had a positive impact
in
managing
the future expectations of the Governing Council.554
968.
On the planned
resolution, Mr Brahimi proposed that it should be discussed
in
Baghdad, to
ensure the issues it would deal with had “a genuine public airing
in Iraq”.
969.
On 4 May, Sir
Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Mr Blair seeking an “informal
steer”
in advance
of a discussion between Chiefs of Staff about the US request for
the
deployment
of additional UK troops.555
970.
The proposal
they were to discuss was for the UK to take on two additional
Iraqi
provinces,
expanding the UK sector from four to six provinces and increasing
troop
levels
temporarily to over 12,000 (from 7,800) before reducing again to “a
steady state
expanded
force of around 10,900”.
551
Public
hearing McColl, 8 February 2010, page 1.
552
Wright Dr
DP & Reese Col TR. On Point
II: Transition to the New Campaign – The United States
Army
in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003 – January 2000. Combined
Studies Institute Press, 2011.
553
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 3 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Brahimi, 3 May’.
554
Letter Owen
to Buck, 5 May 2004, ‘Foreign Secretary’s meeting with Brahimi, 4
May’.
555
Minute
Sheinwald to Blair, 4 May 2004, ‘US Request for More British Troops
in Iraq’.
367