3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
466.
Later in the
conversation, Mr Straw:
“… briefly
described the importance of the UK’s new benchmarks. Unless
Iraq
realised it
was facing its final, final chance, the international community
would not
get Iraq to
face reality. Put bluntly, delay played into the hands of those in
the US
who said we
should not go down the UN route. That said, he was happy to
see
new propositions
at any time.”
467.
Mr de
Villepin concluded that “a way forward could be found”.
Mr Straw replied
that “there
would have to be discussion of these issues at Heads of Government
level,
though not
in New York”.
468.
The UK Embassy
in Paris reported that Mr de Villepin had followed his
rejection
of the UK’s
proposals on 13 March with a briefing emphasising France’s wish to
find a
solution
leading to consensus in the Security Council and referring to his
conversation
469.
Asked to
confirm that France did not exclude an ultimatum, a senior
French
Foreign
Ministry official had, however, been “adamant: any ultimatum that
did not leave
the final
decision to the Security Council constituted a red line … The
French were open
to any
solution that enabled inspections to continue.” The official had
claimed that a
failed
attempt to get a second resolution would annul the effects of the
first resolution;
the Council
would have refused to authorise military intervention and any
intervention
would be
outside the Charter and “at the limit of aggression”.
470.
The Embassy
concluded that Mr de Villepin’s position was “a tactical
move
intended to
deflect criticism” of President Chirac’s announcement of a veto
“‘whatever
the
circumstances”: “It was too little, too late – and the French know
it.”
471.
Mr Blair
agreed the military plan later on 13 March.
472.
On 13 March,
Mr Blair held a meeting, with Mr Prescott, Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon
and Adm
Boyce to discuss the timing of the start of the military campaign
and formal
approval of
the military plan set out in Mr Watkins’ letter of 11 March
(see Section 6.2).142
There was
“a discussion about the timing of the end of the UN process … and
the
start of
military action”. It was agreed that Mr Blair would pursue the
timing issues with
President Bush.
141
Telegram
130 Paris to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Quai
Views’.
142
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
481