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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
69.  Mr Blair replied:
“You do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change unless you
are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that regime change to
ensure the country is stable and the people are properly looked after.
“I think that if stage one is successful, then you will find that the international
community wants to come behind that and make sure the Iraqi people are given the
chance to develop free from the repression of Saddam. I expect that there will be
considerable international support for that, and it is important that we do it … I think
it is extremely important that we do not take our eye off Afghanistan … Getting
rid of the Taliban was not the end, for me. The end is Afghanistan reconstituted
as a country that has got its own internal system working properly and does not
threaten the outside world. In exactly the same way in Iraq, if we come to changing
the regime … then I think it is extremely important that we make the most detailed
preparations and work within the international community as to what happens
afterwards.”
70.  In his memoir, Lord Mandelson, who had resigned from the Government in January
2001, recalled that, in January 2003, he asked Mr Blair:
“‘What happens after you’ve won? … You can go in there, you can take out Saddam
but what do you do with Iraq? You’re going to have a country on your hands. I don’t
know what your plan is. I don’t know how you are going to do it. Who is going to
run the place?’ Tony replied: ‘That’s the Americans’ responsibility. It’s down to the
Americans.’”41
71.  Asked by the Inquiry whether the assumption had been that the US would do most
of the post-conflict planning, Mr Blair stated that:
“… the Americans, of course, would have the primary responsibility, but let me be
absolutely clear I was most certainly not thinking it was to be left to the Americans.
The reason why we had done a lot of planning ourselves was precisely because we
knew we were going to be part of the aftermath …”42
72.  The second round of official-level talks between the US, the UK and Australia
took place in Washington on 22 January.
73.  The talks made little progress.
74.  US officials advised that US/UK differences on the role of the UN would need
to be resolved between Mr Blair and President Bush.
41 Mandelson P. The Third Man: Life at the Heart of New Labour. Harper Press, 2010.
42 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 124.
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