6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

255. The paper identified a number of key assumptions:

• Any operation would be US led and might involve other active coalition partners,

but would be “predominantly enabled by US/UK forces”.

• The UK would provide only coherent, self‑supporting force packages … and

would operate within the framework of a coalition concept of operations.

• The UK would scale its contribution so that the force would “make a meaningful

difference to a coalition effort” and would not be a “token contribution that

attracts no influence or provides insignificant combat power. A small scale of

effort would therefore only be appropriate if the coalition concept of operations

demanded small scale contributions.”

• Operations would not commence before autumn 2002.

• Decisions would not be taken incrementally because that would “add to timelines

by making force generation increasingly complex and costly”.

• Enhancements would be needed to enable units to operate in the Gulf. That

would expose preparations from an early stage given the significant number

of contracts that would be required with industry.

• It might be necessary to maintain force elements in theatre for policing,

stabilisation or humanitarian operations. That had the potential to add

considerably to the costs and commitments burden, depending on the end

state of the campaign.

256. Three broad levels of effort in line with the MOD’s DPAs were examined:

• the maximum the UK could provide (a large scale contribution);

• a “credible” medium scale package; and

• a small scale package.

257. Reflecting the UK’s existing military commitments and the most recent MOD

budgetary planning round, the SPG advised that the UK could realistically produce a

“maximum contribution … at the lower end of large scale … medium scale (minus) for

maritime (about 10 major warships), and medium scale for air (about 60 fast jets)”.

258. The force mix might not be evenly balanced (in terms of scale of effort) across

the sea, land and air environments; but the UK would “always seek to achieve strategic

influence across the three environments such that UK influence is in place throughout

the joint environment”.

259. Also on 24 May, the emerging findings from the SPG analysis were presented

to Mr Hoon to report to Mr Blair before a planned meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld in

early June.131

131 Minute DCDS(C) to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

213