The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
246.
Mr Campbell
subsequently informed the FAC that Parts One and Three
of
the report
were “based on information provided by SIS from a range of
sources”.100
There was
also some intelligence material in Part Two, and Mr Campbell
provided
some examples.
247.
The
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) was informed that the
SIS
representative
at Mr Campbell’s meeting in January had offered to provide a
briefing
note on the
organisation of deception, concealment and intimidation in Iraq as
SIS had
“acquired a
body of information on these matters”.101
The
document provided by SIS was
published
by the ISC in its report.
248.
Mr Campbell
wrote to the CIC authors on 7 February pointing out the
“absolute
necessity
of quality control”.102
That was
“particularly important in any document …
that
includes intelligence assessment”. He took responsibility for the
document and he
“would
defend it on substance”, but he had to be “able to make basic
assumptions about
quality
control”.
249.
Mr Campbell
added that:
“… as the
prospect of conflict grows, we have to be extra sensitive to the
fact that
the media
will want to pick apart our communications.
“So lessons
must be learnt from this, and greater emphasis placed on quality
not
quantity,
and acute sensitivity to the new political and media
realities.”
250.
On 11
February, Sir David Omand, Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary
and
Security
and Intelligence Co-ordinator, issued guidance on the use of
intelligence in CIC
products,
including the need for the lead policy department to be “fully
consulted”.103
Pointing
out that “the reputation of the intelligence community” was “at
risk” whenever
intelligence
material and judgements were “attributed to the Government”, Sir
David
proposed
applying the following rules:
“a. where
intelligence is to be used attributably, in whatever form, the
precise
wording
must be cleared with the Agency originating the material and
the
Assessments
Staff;
b. where
the attributable product is to be released under the rubric that
intelligence
material is
involved, the document as a whole must be cleared with
the
Assessments Staff;
100
Memorandum
Campbell to Foreign Affairs Committee, 24 June 2003, ‘Supplementary
memorandum
from
Alastair Campbell’.
101
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraphs 129-130.
102
Minute
Campbell to Hamill, 7 February 2003, ‘Re: Concealment
Document’.
103
Minute
Omand to Campbell, 11 February 2003, ‘The Use of Intelligence in
CIC Products’.
340