3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –

the negotiation of resolution 1441

451.  Sir Christopher Meyer sent a telegram to Mr Straw later on 11 October.155 He wrote

that President Bush wanted:

“… to be rid of Saddam. He is the prime mover of US policy. He believes that this

can be done in the end only by war. To eliminate the danger presented by Iraqi WMD

is to eliminate Saddam. Anything short of that, including highly intrusive inspections

backed by a new SCR, will not do the trick. Inspections are a tripwire for war.”

452.  Sir Christopher advised that President Bush was “intensely suspicious of the UN”,

and in an:

“… ideal world, he would be on his way now to Baghdad, with a little assistance from

the British and a handful of regional helpers. This is why he is eternally susceptible

to those like Cheney and Rumsfeld who think coalition‑building is of limited utility

and inspections a waste of time (thus their attempt to insert in the UNSCR a

pre‑inspections tripwire in the requirement for Saddam to make a declaration

of his WMD holdings).”

453.  Sir Christopher wrote that his analysis was “a little different” from his advice before

Mr Blair’s visit to Camp David in early September: “the forces arguing for more haste,

less speed have gathered some strength, sharpening dilemmas for the White House”.

454.  Sir Christopher reported that President Bush had “bought the argument that it is

worth trying to maximise international support by giving the Security Council one last

chance”. That argument had “got stronger as the Administration started to focus … on

‘day after’ issues: it is one thing to go to war without … UN cover, quite another to rule

Iraq indefinitely without UN backing”.

455.  The polls were telling the White House that “Americans are far happier about going

to war if they do so in company and under UN cover”. President Bush was “well aware of

the British political debate”. Sir Christopher reported that he had been told by Mr Scooter

Libby, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, that “the UK was the only indispensable

ally for an attack on Iraq”. President Bush’s “rhetoric has been less inflammatory and he

has soft‑pedalled on regime change”. That had “helped him get, by large majorities, the

Congressional resolutions which as near as dammit give him a free hand in Iraq”. With

that behind him, the President was likely to become “increasingly impatient and tough

with the Security Council”.

456.  Sir Christopher warned that if there was no progress in discussions with the

French, “patience could start to expire next week”; and that:

“As I have previously warned, the US and UK’s views of what exhausting the UN

process means could suddenly diverge.

155 Telegram 1326 Washington to FCO London, 11 October 2002, ‘US/Iraq: Will the President go to War’.

281