3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
226.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that Mr Blair was “coming round to the
view that
if the nine
votes weren’t there, then we should not push it to a vote”.
Secretary Powell
responded
that President Bush was on the same wave-length.
227.
Mr Straw
added that “the situation was less clear if we had nine votes but
faced
a veto”.
Secretary Powell suggested that his answer to the question of how
to explain
pulling out
of a vote in that situation would be to “blame Paris and
leave”.
228.
Mr Straw
agreed, stating they could:
“… point to
France signing [resolution] 1441. That resolution had
demanded
‘immediate’
co-operation, but here we were four months later. The
resolution
had
demanded ‘active’ co-operation, but Blix could not confirm that.
And, in four
successive
meetings at the UN, not one of the 15 … members had said that
Iraq
had fully
complied. Iraq was therefore in material breach.”
229.
Secretary
Powell added that the US and UK “had worked hard to obtain a
second
resolution,
but Chirac had clearly said on 10 March that he would veto a
resolution in
any
circumstances”. Mr Straw said they could also point to
Mr Annan’s statement.
230.
In a
subsequent conversation at 10.45pm, Mr Straw and Secretary
Powell
discussed
the indications that Chile and Mexico were thinking about a
timeline of
45 days
and the remarks made earlier that day by Secretary
Rumsfeld.77
231.
When
Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 11
March,
it was
clear that President Bush was determined not to postpone the start
of
military action.
232.
Mr Blair
stated that President Chirac’s remarks gave “some cover” for
ending
the UN
route.
233.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush late on 11 March.78
234.
They discussed
Secretary Rumsfeld’s comments about the UK, the
continuing
problems in
securing support for the resolution and the impact of President
Chirac’s
“veto
threats”. Mr Blair considered that President Chirac’s remarks
“gave some cover”
for ending
the UN route.
235.
President Bush
wrote in his memoir that, at Mr Blair’s request, he “had made
one
last effort
to persuade Mexico and Chile … to support the second
resolution”.79
President
Fox did not
give him an answer. President Lagos had “talked about giving Saddam
an
additional
two to three weeks”. President Bush “told him a few more weeks
would make
77
Letter
Straw to Manning, 12 March 2003, ‘Conversation with US Secretary of
State, 11 March’.
78
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversations with Bush and Lagos,
11
March’.
79
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
439