The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
redesign of our economic and institutional development effort in
Basra
to take
advantage of the improved conditions to deliver accelerated
effect
with full
military-civilian co-ordination.
•
A longer
term ‘Iraq Strategy’, setting out the rationale for the
broad-based
relationship
with the whole of Iraq, for which we are aiming
post-transition.
There is
strong appetite for this form of UK connection among many
Iraqis,
in contrast
to the (inevitable) irritations which have become associated
with
our/the
coalition’s long military presence. Iraq will be an enormously
wealthy
country
with huge needs and long-suppressed demand. The
opportunities
for UK
engagement in so many sectors – education, health, energy,
services
– will be
mouth-watering. And beyond the bilateral interest, there is
the
strategic
interest that the ‘New Iraq’ should develop as a
pro-Western,
broadly
democratic and secular regional power, exercising its
influence
helpfully
in world energy markets and acting as a link from Europe
through
Turkey to
the Gulf and not from revolutionary Iran through Syria to
Hizballah.
•
We will
also need to plan and fund the right long-term platform for
HMG
in Iraq
to take best advantage of these opportunities …”
188.
On 10
September, at the request of the FCO and the MOD, the JIC examined
the
threat from
the evolution of JAM.68
189.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
“I. The
surrender by Jaysh al-Mahdi of its strongholds in Basra, Sadr City
and
al‑Amara
and damage to its reputation have left it in greater disarray and
weaker
than at any
time since 2003.
“II. The
extent to which Muqtada al-Sadr will succeed in his attempt to
transform
JAM into a
primarily ‘cultural’ organisation is unclear. It will not mean a
transition to
exclusively
peaceful activity – Sadr’s model is Lebanese Hizballah and there is
a risk
of at least
some continuing intimidation to enforce strict Islamic
codes.”
190.
The JIC
considered that, although popular support for Muqtada al-Sadr and
his
championship
of the Shia poor remained strong, JAM’s standing had been
undermined
in the past
year by its involvement in criminality, Shia on Shia violence,
collateral
damage to
Karbala’s holy sites and mounting evidence of Iranian support. Its
claim to
be a
“defender of the Shia” was increasingly vulnerable, particularly
following the severe
degradation
of AQ-I.
“III. The
majority of JAM members will continue to lie low and will not
overtly
challenge
Iraqi Security Force (ISF) control in the short term. Whether
Sadr’s new
minority
armed wing resumes attacks on Multi-National Forces (MNF) is likely
to
68
JIC
Assessment, 10 September 2008, ‘Iraq: the Future of Jaysh
al-Mahdi’.
412