9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
51.
On 5 July,
Mr Richmond annotated the advice:
“As the
comments from HMA Baghdad and … General Lamb … make clear,
this
may well
raise difficult issues in our relations with the US and the Iraqi
Government.
But you
would only be authorising discussion at this stage (and MOD
officials
have
confirmed that the Defence Secretary is keen to press ahead). I
therefore
recommend
that you agree to the proposal. Nigel Casey, the Acting
Director
52.
On 6 July,
Mr Miliband’s Private Secretary wrote to the senior official
who wrote
the 4 July
advice to say that Mr Miliband agreed that the discussion
should “proceed as
53.
Mr Brown
spoke to Prime Minister Maliki on 5 July.28
He welcomed
the recent
security
appointments in Basra and hoped that they would pave the way for
further
progress
towards transition to Iraqi control of security. Mr Brown said
that he would like
to discuss
the scope for economic initiatives (see Section 10.2).
54.
Prime Minister
Maliki said that he hoped it would be possible to reduce the
burden
on UK
forces and for Iraqi forces to take the lead within three months.
He hoped that UK
forces
would support this and not seek to take the lead themselves. It was
important for
the new
Iraqi military commander in Basra to establish his authority, not
least because
Iraqi
forces would soon have to take action against “troublemakers”
there.
55.
The weekly
Iraq update for Mr Brown on 6 July set out the range of views
on
transition
to PIC in Basra:
“Maliki
seemed content with a target date of September, which would allow
greater
progress on
Iraqi Security Forces’ readiness. US Ambassador Crocker and
General
Petraeus
were very negative about early transition to PIC, without a
significant effort
to embed
new Iraqi security strictures and visible political
progress.
“Both
General Mohan and … Mowaffaq Al-Rubaie [Iraqi National Security
Adviser]
focused on
the advantages of early handover.”29
56.
The update
also said:
“There have
been some signs … of a ‘cease-fire’ in Basra. But this can be
overdone.
[Government
officials working closely with the military] and MND(SE) have
been
talking for
some time to … [JAM1], about agreeing a ‘cease-fire’ in return for
limited
prisoner
releases … There has been intelligence chatter to the effect that
this is now
26
Minute
senior official specialising in the Middle East to
Richmond/Miliband, 4 July 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’ including manuscript comment
Richmond.
27
Letter
Hayes to senior official specialising in the Middle East, 6 July
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
Negotiations
with JAM in Basrah’.
28
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 5 July 2007, ‘Conversation with Iraqi Prime
Minister’.
29
Minute
Banner to Brown, 6 July 2007, ‘Iraq – Weekly Update’.
193