Previous page | Contents | Next page
9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004
601.  Shortly afterwards, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that:
“Efforts by the CPA to resolve the impasse … over the 15 November Agreement
were further complicated on 27 November by reports to the CPA governance team
that [Grand] Ayatollah [al-]Sistani has come out in favour of direct elections to the
TLA [Transitional Legislative Assembly].”338
602.  In a statement on 28 November, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani set out his
“reservations” regarding the 15 November Agreement:
“Firstly, it is based on preparing the law of the Iraqi state, for the transitional period,
through the Governing Council in conjunction with the Occupying Power – thus not
providing it with legitimacy. For this (legitimacy) to be achieved it must be presented
to representatives of the Iraqi people for approval.
“Secondly, the mechanism in place to choose members of the Transitional
Legislative Assembly does not guarantee the establishment of an assembly that truly
represents the Iraqi people. Therefore this mechanism must be replaced with one
that guarantees the aforesaid, which is ‘elections’, so the Assembly will emanate
from the desire of the Iraqi people and will represent them fairly without its legitimacy
being tarnished in any way.”339
December 2003
603.  By 1 December, the GC had not agreed a way ahead in relation to Grand Ayatollah
al-Sistani’s objections beyond creating a committee to discuss the mechanics of
implementation.340
604.  In early December, the Iraq Senior Officials Group concluded that “a new joined
up approach to campaign planning [with the US] had not translated into reality on the
ground”.341
605.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 4 December.342 During
the conversation Mr Blair underlined the importance of Iraqiisation, including involving
the Sunni community and former Ba’athists. He suggested that the Coalition should
aim to mobilise tribal leadership, as the UK was doing in the South. Mr Blair welcomed
“improvements in co-ordination” and stressed that the focus should be on security.
338  Telegram 292 IraqRep to FCO London, 28 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Sistani Views’.
339  Talmon S. The Occupation of Iraq: Volume II The Official Documents of the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council. Hart Publishing, 2013.
340  Telegram 294 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Sistani Update’.
341  Letter Dodd to Sheinwald, 1 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group’.
342  Letter Cannon to Adams, 4 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video-Conference with President
Bush, 4 December’.
307
Previous page | Contents | Next page