6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
558.
The Barry
Report stated:
“Small arms
ammunition was in such short supply that 1 DWR [Duke of
Wellington’s
Regiment]
had only 10% of its requirement until after G-day, and some
Royal
Engineers
started the operation with only 10 rounds per man.”288
559.
In his
post-operation report Brig Binns wrote: “Ammunition was a constant
cause
of concern
throughout the deployment.”289
560.
The NAO’s
December 2003 Op TELIC report stated:
“Lack of
consignment tracking led to inefficiencies … There were
difficulties in
scheduling
the delivery of some supplies due to mis-prioritisation of loading
of
stocks for
transport. For example, the majority of the force’s flat racks
(required
for the
movement of ammunition by specialist vehicles) were on the
penultimate
deployment
ship, arriving in Kuwait in 17 March. This significantly
limited the ability
of logistic
units to move ammunition to the frontline and exacerbated a
perception
among
troops that there were ammunition shortages.”290
561.
Brig Cowlam
told the House of Commons Defence Select Committee that all
units
had been
issued ammunition during the initial deployment to Iraq when stocks
were
562.
The House of
Commons Defence Committee concluded:
“Our
examination suggests that there were problems with the supply of
ammunition
when the
fighting echelon began operations. MOD accepts that in the very
early
stages
there were some problems and not all service personnel had the
right
amount. We
expect MOD to establish the scale of the problem, to investigate
any
specific
cases identified, in particular the tragic incident involving the
six Royal
Military
Policemen [See Section 9.2], and to implement the necessary action
to avoid
any
re-occurrence in the future.”292
563.
Gen Reith told
the Inquiry there was “a scrabble at the end to find certain
items,
particularly
the ceramic plates for the flak jackets, and some natures of
ammunition.”293
288
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From
a Land Perspective’.
289
Report,
6 June 2003, ‘7th Armoured Brigade Post Operation Report &
Lessons Report Operation
TELIC’.
290
National
Audit Office, Operation
TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,
11 December 2003,
HC 60.
291
Third
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2003-04,
Lessons of
Iraq, HC57-I,
para 268.
292
Third
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2003-04,
Lessons of
Iraq, HC 57-I,
para 270.
293
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 52.
91