The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
620.
A Note for the
Record written by Mr McDonald on 15 March reported that
Cabinet
on 17 March
would need:
“… to be
choreographed with the Security Council meeting where
Jeremy
Greenstock
would announce that we were pulling our resolution.
“The
Foreign Secretary assumed the Cabinet would meet sometime in the
morning.
It will
need specifically to approve the course of action proposed and to
have passed
across the
terms of the Commons motion for Tuesday.
“… it might
be a good idea for him [Mr Straw] to do a statement on Monday
to inform
colleagues
of the decision to withdraw … A statement … might give us a
better
chance of
assessing from where the strongest arguments would
come.”211
621.
The FCO
advised No.10 that the UK’s “aim should be to leave the
current
diplomatic
process in a way that helps ensure that we can return to the
Council shortly
for action
on other important areas, such as amending the Iraq sanctions
regime and
obtaining
UN authorisation of post conflict arrangements”.212
That could
best be done by
a “short
statement” by Sir Jeremy Greenstock in informal Council
consultations, making
clear that
the UK “regretted that it had proved impossible to make progress on
our text
and that we
were not taking any further action on it”: “Ideally this should
coincide with
any US
announcement of a short final ultimatum to Iraq.”
622.
The FCO also
identified the risk of a resolution being tabled in the
Security
Council or
the UN General Assembly criticising the use of force; the need to
address
travel
advice and the safety of UK nationals in the region; and the
reaction to the US
announcement
about publishing a Road Map on the MEPP.
623.
Mr Ricketts
subsequently advised that Sir Jeremy Greenstock had pointed out
“that
we should
try to keep the issue open in the Security Council for as long as
possible in
order to
minimise the risk of rival initiatives”; and that “a key element”
of that strategy
would be
“to ensure that we do not say we are closing down or giving up on
the Security
624.
Sir David
Manning recorded that Mr Blair had made those points
“strongly” at the
211
Note,
McDonald, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Attorney
General’.
212
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 15 March 2003, ‘Azores Summit’.
213
Letter
Ricketts to Manning, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Azores’.
214
Manuscript
comment Manning, 17 March 2003, on Letter Ricketts to Manning, 16
March 2003,
‘Iraq: Azores’.
506