6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

279.  Mr Jonathan Powell advised Mr Blair to avoid a repeat of the Afghanistan

experience, where there had been a “scramble” to get post-conflict arrangements

ready. He advised that post-conflict planning for Iraq needed to start immediately.

280.  In his diaries, Mr Chris Mullin, Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee

from 2001to 2003, recorded that he raised post-conflict issues with Mr Blair at a meeting

of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) on 17 July.156 Mr Mullin stated that the UK

needed to be thinking about a number of issues, including what Saddam Hussein would

do if cornered, the extent of the collateral damage and “how much help would we get

from the Americans when it came to clearing up afterwards?”

281.  Mr Mullin recorded that Mr Blair had replied that those questions needed to be

answered:

“‘… if we can’t answer them we won’t do it.’ He [Mr Blair] added that, contrary to

what most people seemed to believe, the Americans had stayed engaged both in

Kosovo and in Afghanistan.”

282.  On 19 July, OD Sec issued ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.157 The paper,

described in more detail in Section 3.3, reminded Ministers that Mr Blair had discussed

Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April, where he had said the UK would support

military action to bring about regime change, provided certain conditions were met.

283.  The paper stated that the considerations and preparations that needed to be

addressed to “fulfil the conditions” set out by Mr Blair included an analysis of whether the

benefits of military action outweighed the risks, including whether a “post-war occupation

of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise”. US military plans

were “virtually silent” on that point and Washington could look to the UK to “share a

disproportionate share of the burden”. Further work was needed on what form of government

might replace Saddam Hussein’s regime and the timescale for identifying a successor.

284.  Mr Powell made a similar point in a note for Mr Blair on 19 July, in which he

suggested points to put in writing to President Bush. Those included:

“… we need a plan for the day after. Loya Jirga158 and peacekeeping in Afghanistan

have worked well but we had to scramble to get them ready in time. We need to be

working on this now for Iraq …”159

285.  Sir Kevin Tebbit visited Washington from 17 to 20 July for talks with senior US

officials, including Mr Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), Mr Stephen Hadley

156  Mullin C. A View from the Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin. Profile Books, 2009.

157  Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.

158  A grand assembly of elders in Afghanistan or Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

159  Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

161