The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

basis of this declaration, on the basis of the evidence before us, our path for the coming

weeks is clear.”

356.  Secretary Powell proposed a four‑step approach in the coming weeks to:

• audit and examine the Iraqi declaration “to understand the full extent of Iraq’s

failure to meet its disclosure obligations”;

• conduct interviews with scientists and other witnesses outside Iraq;

• intensify UN inspectors’ efforts inside Iraq; and

• consult the Security Council and US allies on how to compel Iraq to comply with

the terms of the resolution.

357.  Secretary Powell stated that the United States, and he hoped other Council

members, would “provide the inspectors with every possible assistance, all the support

they need to succeed in their crucial mission”. Resolution 1441 had called for “serious

consequences for Iraq” if it did not comply. So far, Iraq was “well on its way to losing its

last chance”. There was “no calendar deadline”, but there was “a practical limit to how

much longer you can just go down the road of non‑co‑operation and how much time the

inspectors can be given to do their work … This situation cannot continue.”

358.  Mr Straw and Secretary Powell had spoken before the press conference about

Mr Straw’s remarks on the BBC’s Today programme earlier that day. Mr Straw said

that he had “repeated [the] long standing position that [the UK] would prefer a second

resolution, with the usual Kosovo caveats”.126

359.  Mr Straw and Secretary Powell also discussed the need for the White House

to be clear about Mr Blair’s position.

360.  In a letter to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary, Mr Ehrman wrote:

“With the American military machine now increasingly set on auto‑pilot towards war,

the nightmare scenario of the UK having to decide whether to join US military action

without a second SCR is only made more likely …”127

361.  Sir Christopher Meyer reported on 19 December that there was “some fairly

intensive kremlinology going on in the White House about the British political scene …

What did Tony Blair need to be able comfortably to go to war?”.128 The current US view

“which could change, was that a second SCR was attainable”. Sir Christopher had told

a senior US official that “a spring war looked as close as possible to being inevitable

without actually being inevitable”.

126  Letter McDonald to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin Powell, 19 December’.

127  Minute Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Passing Intelligence

to UNMOVIC’.

128  Letter Meyer to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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