4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
293.
The Butler
Report concluded that, for Iraq, readers of JIC Assessments
would:
“… have had
an impression of:
a.
The
continuing clear strategic intent on the part of the Iraqi regime
to
pursue its
nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile
programmes.
b.
Continuing efforts by the Iraqi regime to sustain and where
possible
develop its
indigenous capabilities, including through procurement
of
necessary
material.
c.
The
development, drawing on those capabilities, of Iraq’s ‘break
out’
potential
in the chemical, biological and ballistic missile fields, coupled
with
the proven
ability to weaponise onto some delivery systems chemical
and
294.
The Inquiry
concurs with that conclusion.
295.
Mr Dowse
told the Inquiry:
“If
sanctions were to go … our assessment was that Saddam would very
quickly aim
to rebuild
his WMD programmes and then would pose a threat to his neighbours
and
296.
Asked about
the impact of international conventions, Mr Dowse
added:
“… the view
was that Iraq would be likely to ignore them. It had a long history
of
cheating,
attempting to hide, attempting to evade those controls. So I would
say we
had very
little doubt that Saddam would try to rebuild his
programmes.”
297.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that, having got the capability, Iraq was capable
of using
it.129
Asked
whether Iraq’s nuclear programme had been frozen, Mr Hoon
responded:
“His
[Saddam Hussein’s] nuclear programme had been frozen because of
the
absence of
fissile material, but I think there was sense that his efforts to
develop
larger and
longer-range missiles was part of an ambition to deliver a
nuclear
weapon, if
he could secure the fissile material.”
298.
Sir William
Ehrman stated that, in relation to chemical and biological
capabilities,
there were
concerns about Iraq, “particularly through the spring and summer
of
2002”,
although much of the intelligence on which that was based was
subsequently
withdrawn.130
Iraq’s
previous actions in using chemical weapons and its breaches
of
UN Security
Council resolutions also made it a unique case.
127
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
255.
128
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, pages15-16.
129
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 27.
130
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, page 10.
69