3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
118.
Mr McKane
added that there had been diplomatic activity over the summer
to
explore
options. In relation to the end of November deadline for the
renewal of the
sanctions
regime authorised by resolution 1360 in July 2001, the US had
supported
reviving
the UK draft “smart sanctions” resolution. But Mr McKane advised
that “it was
doubtful in
current circumstances whether they [the US] would be willing to
throw much
weight
behind it, particularly with the Russians”.
119.
Mr McKane
reported that officials had agreed that a revised draft resolution,
which
“dropped
the proposals to tighten existing controls and the references to
neighbouring
states”,
was the option “most likely to succeed in building a consensus”. He
added:
“In
practice, there was no realistic prospect of tightening the
existing controls at the
present
time, though we should return to this at a later
date.”
120.
Mr William
Patey, Head FCO Middle East Department, advised Mr
Straw:
“In the
context of building the broadest possible coalition for a sustained
attack on
terrorism
we need to address some of the wider concerns about our Iraq policy
…
“The main
objection to the current proposals is the perception that they
impose
additional
obligations on neighbouring states by putting the onus on them
for
enforcing
sanctions on Iraq. The reality is that our draft resolution does
not impose
any new
obligations on neighbouring states … These tightening provisions
were
mainly
window dressing. We would not lose a great deal in reality by
removing
the
provision relating to neighbouring states although it would
increase the
presentational
difficulties for the US.
“… we would
undermine the Russian and other objections, and increase
the
prospects
for consensus in the Security Council. The unanimous backing … for
a
Goods
Review List is worth having. It would not remove the existing
obligations on
neighbouring
states or the international community as a whole … This would not
be
easy to
sell … but the alternative is a weakening of containment through
growing
sanctions
busting and the withering away of existing controls on Iraq. This
would
leave us
with little to fall back on, other than excessive reliance on
military force,
which in
turn would undermine our ability to maintain a coalition against
terrorism.”65
121.
Mr Alan
Goulty, FCO Director Middle East and North Africa,
commented:
“If this
approach is to be tried we should tackle the Americans soon. The
key
argument is
that progress on Iraq will help coalition-building. But that will
be hard
to sell
to the Washington hawks, especially in the
Pentagon.”66
65
Minute
Patey to Goulty and PS [FCO], 20 September 2001, ‘Iraq: Way
Forward’.
66
Manuscript
comment Goulty, 20 September 2001, on Minute Patey to Goulty and PS
[FCO],
20
September 2001, ‘Iraq: Way Forward’.
333