The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
423.
Mr Browne
agreed to the request on 11 November.218
424.
The IED threat
constrained the UK’s ability to deliver Security Sector Reform
(SSR)
and Civil
Military Co‑operation (CIMIC) as military officers, police officers
and civilian
personnel
were unable to move safely around MND(SE).
425.
Lt Gen Dutton
told the Inquiry that he had an “optimistic” briefing from the
MOD
before he
started as GOC MND(SE) – that his role was to keep SSR “ticking
over” – but
that was
skewed “massively” by the increased EFP threat when he arrived in
Basra.219
426.
On 11
November, Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, the lead on
international
affairs for
the Association of Chief Police Officers, contacted the Home Office
to express
concern
about a report that Maj Gen Dutton had stated that he
wanted to see civilian
police
personnel travel in Snatch vehicles, and that
Maj Gen Dutton had suggested he
would
review – or even terminate – the relevant contracts of employment
to ensure that
427.
On 20
November, Sergeant John Jones was killed whilst on patrol in
Basra
when his
vehicle hit a roadside IED.221
Four others
sustained injuries in the attack,
one seriously.
428.
Gen Walker
visited Iraq from 22 to 24 November.222
His visit
report stated that
there was
no “sole technical answer” to IEDs and “defensive tactics,
techniques and
procedures,
and disruption of the terrorists, were essential parts of an
overall solution”.
429.
On 29
November, Major General William Rollo, ACGS from January 2005,
reported
to
Gen Jackson on his recent trip to Iraq:
“The PIR
IED threat is of real concern, and we are now more fixed by
force
protection
than ever before. The effect of these weapons is constraining
activity
across all
lines of operation, including SSR. Whilst overall numbers of
attacks across
the
division has reduced, the effectiveness of each attack has risen
sharply and the
opposition
now achieves a coalition casualty rate exceeding one killed for
every PIR
430.
The report was
forwarded to Gen Walker.224
218
Letter
Browne to Reid, 11 November 2005, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational
Requirements (UORs)’.
219
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 17.
220
Email
Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 11 November 2005, ‘UK
civil police assistance effort
in Iraq
– command & control issues – request for clarity’.
221
GOV.UK,
21 November
2005, Sergeant
John Jones killed in Iraq;
BBC
News, 22 November
2005,
Tributes to
Iraq blast sergeant.
222
Minute
PSO/CDS to PS/SofS [MOD], 25 November 2005, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq –
22‑24 Nov 05’.
223
Minute ACGS
to CGS, 29 November 2005, ‘ACGS Visit Report from Operation
TELIC’.
224
Minute
MA1/CGS to PSO/CDS, 12 December 2005, ‘ACGS Visit to Iraq: 18‑20
NOV 05’.
72