The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

140. Mr Blair added that he had:

“… no doubt we need to deal with Saddam. But if we hit Iraq now, we would lose the

Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU … I am sure we can devise a strategy for

Saddam deliverable at a later date.”

141. Mr Blair suggested that:

“… in order to give ourselves space that we say:

“Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan because it’s there that the

perpetrators of 11 September hide.

“Phase 2 is the medium and longer term campaign against terrorism in all its forms.

Of course we will discuss that … This kicks it away for the moment but leaves all

options open. We just don’t need it debated too freely in public until we know what

exactly we want to do; and how we can do it.”

142. Mr Blair concluded that a “dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit” was required,

and suggested that he and President Bush should “talk soon”.

143. In a telephone conversation on 17 October, mainly about Afghanistan, Mr Blair and

President Bush discussed the recent anthrax attacks on the US and whether the source

of the material might be Iraq.76

144. In his memoir, President Bush wrote that “One of the best intelligence services

in Europe” had told the US it suspected Iraq.77

145. On 19 October, US Special Forces landed in Afghanistan to link up with the CIA

and Northern Alliance.78

146. Lord Wilson of Dinton, Cabinet Secretary from 1998 to September 2002, told the

Inquiry that he thought Mr Blair had:

“… played … an important part in dissuading them [the US] from any thoughts

that 9/11 was connected with Iraq and dissuading them from taking any action

against Iraq”.79

147. Lord Wilson stated that international terrorism and the military action in Afghanistan

was the major focus of the UK government at that time.80

148. By mid-October, discussions on a revised economic sanctions regime for

Iraq had made little progress. Russia was seen as the main obstacle to agreement.

76 Letter Wechsberg to McDonald, 17 October 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation with

President Bush: 17 October’.

77 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

78 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

79 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 13.

80 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 28.

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