The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
481.
The decision
that Lord Goldsmith would take the lead in explaining
the
Government’s
legal position to Parliament, rather than the Prime Minister or
responsible
Secretary
of State providing that explanation, was unusual.
482.
The normal
practice was, and is, that the Minister responsible for the policy,
in this
case
Mr Blair or Mr Straw, would have made such a
statement.
483.
Cabinet was
provided with the text of Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer to
Baroness
Ramsey of
Cartvale setting out the legal basis for military
action.
484.
That document
represented a statement of the Government’s legal position
–
it did
not explain the legal basis of the conclusion that Iraq had failed
to take “the final
opportunity”
to comply with its disarmament obligations offered by resolution
1441.
485.
Lord Goldsmith
told Cabinet that it was “plain” that Iraq had failed to comply
with
its
obligations and continued to be in “material breach” of the
relevant Security Council
resolutions.
The authority to use force under resolution 678 was, “as a result”,
revived.
Lord
Goldsmith said that there was no need for a further
resolution.
486.
Cabinet was
not provided with written advice which set out, as the advice
of
7 March
had done, the conflicting arguments regarding the legal effect of
resolution 1441
and
whether, in particular, it authorised military action without a
further resolution of the
Security
Council.
487.
Cabinet was
not provided with, or informed of, Mr Brummell’s letter to
Mr Rycroft
of 14
March; or Mr Rycroft’s response of 15 March. Cabinet was not
told how Mr Blair
had reached
the view recorded in Mr Rycroft’s letter.
488.
The majority
of Cabinet members who gave evidence to the Inquiry took
the
position
that the role of the Attorney General on 17 March was, simply, to
tell Cabinet
whether or
not there was a legal basis for military action.
489.
None of those
Ministers who had read Lord Goldsmith’s 7 March advice
asked
for an
explanation as to why his legal view of resolution 1441 had
changed.
490.
There was
little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith about his advice,
and
no substantive
discussion of the legal issues was recorded.
491.
Cabinet was
not misled on 17 March and the exchange of letters
between
the
Attorney General’s office and No.10 on 14 and 15 March did not
constitute,
as suggested
to the Inquiry by Ms Short, a “side deal”.
492.
Cabinet was,
however, being asked to confirm the decision that the
diplomatic
process was
at an end and that the House of Commons should be asked to
endorse
the use of
military action to enforce Iraq’s compliance. Given the gravity of
this decision,
Cabinet
should have been made aware of the legal
uncertainties.
68