The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
working
closely with the military] and some judicious risk taking kept us
in the game.
As a
formation commander in Kosovo I could claim that I had
significantly more
freedom of
action than my US counterparts – not so now.”
791.
Maj Gen Binns
concluded: “I did not think I would depart feeling so optimistic
about
Iraq and
its future.”
792.
Maj Gen Binns
told the Inquiry:
“I’m wiser
now and I think in that report I was just expressing the natural
frustrations
of somebody
who is really trying to make the process work, living with
the
consequences
of failure, and just being frustrated by what I thought was
a risk
averse
culture back here. But I’m wiser and I’m probably now grateful that
there
was
oversight and that somebody back here had taken responsibility and
had been
properly
briefed. But at the time, as a field commander, I was
frustrated by what
I perceived
to be a lack of delegated authority.”383
793.
In advance of
the 14 February meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group, Mr Day
wrote
to Ms
Aldred setting out five options for future force levels from
November 2008, not
yet
considered by MOD Ministers.384
All options
assumed that legal cover for the UK
presence
would be found and that the threat in Basra would not deteriorate
significantly.
794.
The
“illustrative” options ranged from maintaining the status quo
(around
2,800 troops
at Basra Air Station including a two- or one-star
headquarters,
two battlegroup
equivalents and integral force protection, enabling and logistic
support)
to complete
withdrawal.
795.
Retaining
2,800 troops would require no increase to the US presence in
Basra
and would
meet what the UK understood to be the US aspirations for a UK
contribution.
Mr Day
judged that “in the absence of an entirely benign security
environment,
1,000‑1,500
is likely to be the minimum force level to support a national
presence
in the COB”.
Although it was assumed that at some stage the COB would be
handed
over to the
US, doing so would be “potentially destabilising”.
796.
On 13
February, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed three major
pieces of
legislation:
the 2008 Budget Law, the Provincial Powers Law and the Amnesty
Law.385
An
official in
the FCO Iraq Group judged that:
“Passage of
these long awaited laws is welcomed, not least because it should
help
to reduce
the tension that has been building between the Kurds and Arabs in
the
Council of
Representatives. We have long been calling for early elections and
action
383
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, pages 26-27.
384
Letter Day
to Aldred, 13 February 2008, ‘Potential Options for the UK Military
Commitment in Southern
Iraq in
2009’.
385
Email Iraq
Group [junior official] to Hickey, 15 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Passage
of Budget, Amnesty and
Provincial
Powers Laws: Statement and Personal Message’.
328