7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

335. The JIC Assessment of 10 February 2003 repeated previous warnings that:

• Al Qaida and associated networks would remain the greatest terrorist threat

to the UK and its activity would increase at the onset of any military action

against Iraq.

• In the event of imminent regime collapse, Iraqi chemical and biological material

could be transferred to terrorists, including Al Qaida.159

336. Addressing the prospects for the future, the JIC Assessment concluded:

“… Al Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the

greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened

by military action against Iraq. The broader threat from Islamist terrorists will also

increase in the event of war, reflecting intensified anti-US/anti-Western sentiment in

the Muslim world, including among Muslim communities in the West. And there is a

risk that the transfer of CB [chemical and biological] material or expertise, during or

in the aftermath of conflict, will enhance Al Qaida’s capabilities.”

337. In response to a call for Muslims everywhere to take up arms in defence of Iraq

issued by Usama Bin Laden on 11 February, and a further call on 16 February for

“compulsory jihad” by Muslims against the West, the JIC Assessment on 19 February

predicted that the upward trend in the reports of threats to the UK was likely to

continue.160

338. The JIC continued to warn in March that the threat from Al Qaida would increase

at the onset of military action against Iraq.161

339. The JIC also warned that:

• Al Qaida activity in northern Iraq continued.

• Al Qaida might have established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be activated during

a US occupation.

340. The warning about the risk of chemical and biological weapons becoming available

to extremist groups as a result of military action in Iraq was reiterated on 19 March.162

341. Addressing the JIC Assessment of 10 February 2003, Mr Blair told the Intelligence

and Security Committee (ISC) later that year that:

“One of the most difficult aspects of this is that there was obviously a danger that

in attacking Iraq you ended up provoking the very thing you were trying to avoid.

On the other hand I think you had to ask the question, ‘Could you really, as a result

159 JIC Assessment, 10 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq’.

160 JIC Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: The Current Threat from Islamic

Extremists’.

161 JIC Assessment, 12 March 2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq: Update’.

162 Note JIC, 19 March 2003, ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’.

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