The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
post-conflict
administration, Mr Straw responded to a question about how
long UK troops
would stay,
saying:
“… our
assumption was that they would be around for quite a long time. We
had
gone for
the biggest of the three options we had considered … partly in
order to help
with the
occupation.”
90.
Before he had
seen the record of the Washington talks, Mr Mike O’Brien,
FCO
Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State, set out his views on the creation of
a
democratic
federal Iraq in a note to Mr Straw.50
Mr O’Brien
argued that US plans for
a
post-conflict “military regime” would “go down badly in the Muslim
world”. Instead,
the period
between a second resolution and the start of military action should
be used
to set out
a programme for bringing about a democratic federal Iraq run by
Iraqis. He
recommended
“a major exercise” to bring together opposition groups to negotiate
a
constitution,
with Western assistance, as soon as possible. Mr O’Brien added
that a
transitional
authority “would need to rely on the recruitment of Iraqis from
within the
Saddam
Hussein administration as well as some of the diaspora
opposition”.
91.
Mr Chaplin
commented:
“I have no
problem in setting democracy as a goal for Iraq … But we have to
be
careful how
we present this. To most Arabs ‘democracy’ means imposing
Western
style
institutions on the Arab world, for our own benefit. It is wiser …
to talk about the
application
of universal principles such as democratic values, good governance,
the
rule of law
and so on …
“My only
point of disagreement in Mike O’Brien’s analysis is that ‘we’ ie
the Coalition
should
negotiate a new constitution for Iraq with Iraqi opposition groups.
Firstly …
a new
constitution must be seen to be developed by the Iraqis themselves.
What
we will be
doing is holding the ring to allow that process to take place.
Secondly
Iraqi
opposition groups are a very disparate bunch. A few of them …
represent a
constituency
on the ground in Iraq. Most of them represent only
themselves.”51
92.
Immediately
after the 22 January Washington talks, the Cabinet Office
told
departments
that follow-up work was urgent. Officials were instructed to take
the
initiative
with the US.
93.
The AHGI
co-ordinated follow-up to the Washington talks.52
50
Minute
O’Brien to Straw, 22 January 2003, ‘Post Saddam Iraq’.
51
Minute
Chaplin to PS/Mr O’Brien, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
52
Letter
Drummond to Chaplin, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Working
Groups’.
326