3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
402.
Mr Blair
recognised the difficulties but commented that it was hard to
see
a way
through unless “we just don’t do it”; and he thought it was right
to take
action.
403.
Mr Straw spoke
to Secretary Powell on 26 July to seek a one-to one
discussion
on Iraq
in late August.158
404.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that meetings in the US “the week after
next”
would “become
‘much more serious’ but would not necessarily accelerate the
timing
of any
action”.
405.
Mr Straw
stated that Iraq was “an increasingly big issue in the UK”. As well
as
planning
military action, there was a need “to make the case in public for
such action”.
There was
also a need for a process, as had happened in relation to
Afghanistan, for
“getting as
many people on board internationally as possible”.
406.
Mr Straw and
Secretary Powell discussed the papers prepared for publication
on
Iraq and
whether they set out the case against Iraq in strong enough terms.
Secretary
Powell said
that Mr Tenet was looking at a paper for possible publication. Mr
Straw
“rehearsed
the history” of the UK paper (see Section 4.1) and said:
“Objectively, the
case
against Iraq was third or fourth strongest; Iraq was not in a top
priority category
of its
own.”
407.
Mr Straw told
Secretary Powell that serious people were writing to Mr
Blair
questioning
“how was Iraq different from North Korea Libya or Iran” and “why
was action
necessary
now”. Sir Michael Quinlan, a former Permanent Under Secretary of
the
MOD, had
asked what had changed in the last year, and whether there was
really any
evidence
that Saddam Hussein was about to use WMD. Sir Michael had concluded
that
not much
had changed.
408.
Mr Straw told
Secretary Powell that he “knew that some issues were
difficult
in
Washington – weapons inspectors and issuing an ultimatum – but they
still had to
be faced”.
409.
Mr Straw’s
view was that Saddam Hussein was “evil but not
insane”.
Secretary Powell
referred to the warning about the use of WMD the US had
issued
to Saddam
Hussein in 1991.
410.
Mr Straw and
Secretary Powell also discussed the consequences of military
action;
and that
the only way to ensure a strong central government would be for the
US and
UK to stay
on. That might require “an army of occupation for years to
come”.
411.
As well as the
formal record of the discussion, Mr Straw sent Mr Blair a
handwritten
letter
rehearsing doubts about the strength of the case for military
action against Iraq.159
158
Minute
McDonald to Ricketts, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
159
Letter
(handwritten) Straw to Blair, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
71