3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
558.
The Embassy
reported that the Government had a week later released a
Foreign
Office
briefing paper to the Parliamentary Labour Party “that outlined the
case against
Iraq”. That
had been followed by the article in The
Times by Mr Straw
[on 5 March] and
a similar
piece by Mr Blair the following day. The subsequent “debate” on the
issue in the
House of
Commons was described as “sharp”, with opposition to military
action going
“unfortunately,
well beyond the ‘usual suspects’”. The large number of signatories
of an
Early Day
Motion opposing support for US military action, 130 of whom 100
were Labour
MPs, was
“significant” and “many more … did not sign” but agreed with its
thrust. The
MPs were
seen to be reflecting overall voter opinion.
559.
Labour MPs who
considered “themselves to be moderate and strongly
pro-US”
had told
the US Embassy that they needed “more evidence of Iraq’s connivance
with
terrorism
and/or willingness to use WMD before they could support HMG
co-operation
with
military action”. Labour MPs had “especially” raised “concerns
about the reaction
of the
Arab world”. “Several MPs” had also told the Embassy “that progress
in the Middle
East Peace
Process could defuse some of their concerns”. “Another element
raised was
that there
would be less negative fallout if military action were taken only
after all other
options
were seen to have been exhausted” and “virtually all MPs with whom
we spoke”
wanted “the
UN to endorse any military action”. MPs were worried:
“… that the
US is ‘looking for another fight’ and will ‘ignore even its close
friends
if they
object’ … There is the impression … that the US is not
acknowledging the
relevance
of the UK to the US agenda.”
560.
Addressing
what it would take to convince Labour Parliamentarians to
support
military
action against Iraq, Ambassador Farish wrote that widespread
revulsion with
the Iraqi
regime did not:
“…
necessarily translate into support for war. Some MPs would endorse
action if
they had
proof that Iraq has continued to develop WMD since UN inspectors
left.
More would
follow if convinced that Iraq has succeeded in developing
significant
WMD
capability (not just CW, but BW and/or nuclear/radiological) and
the missiles
to deliver
it. Many more would follow if they see compelling evidence that
Iraq
intends and
plans to use such weapons. A clear majority would support
military
action
against Iraq if Saddam is implicated in the 9/11 attacks or other
egregious
acts of
terrorism. Other factors of influence include … Arab sentiment,
progress in
the MEPP,
UN support, civilian casualties, and having a plan that
works.
“Since
making his decision to move to a more robust public diplomacy on
Iraq,
Blair plus
Straw and … Hoon have made a string of tough statements. Blair
was
especially
forthright when standing alongside VP Cheney on March
11.”
561.
Ambassador
Farish concluded:
“Blair has
proved an excellent judge of political timing, and he will need to
be
especially
careful about when to launch a ramped-up campaign to build
support
489