The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

177. President Bush added that Vice President Cheney and Mr Rumsfeld “believed that

going to the UN would trigger a long bureaucratic process that would leave Saddam

even more dangerous”. But Secretary Powell had told him that “a UN resolution was

the only way to get any support from the rest of the world”; and that, “if we did take out

Saddam the military strike would be the easy part. Then … America would ‘own’ Iraq.”

178. President Bush and Mr Blair discussed the need to make clear that Iraq was

the UN’s problem on 29 August. The issue had to be disarmament, not just the

return of the inspectors, with a tough and unconditional resolution so that if Iraq

complied it would change the way the regime operated.

179. Mr Blair’s view was that conflict was “inevitable” because he did not think

that Saddam Hussein would comply with the UN’s demands; “but the choice

was Saddam’s”.

180. Mr Blair and President Bush spoke on 29 August.64

181. Mr Rycroft recorded that Mr Blair and President Bush had discussed the

implications of speculation in August and Mr Blair’s view that the US and UK had been

“outed before being fully ready to make the case” against Saddam Hussein.

182. Mr Blair and President Bush had also discussed the need to make clear that Iraq

was the UN’s problem and that the issue was total disarmament of Iraq’s WMD and

associated systems not just the reintroduction of inspectors. The next phase should be

to go to the Security Council with a resolution which put the burden on Iraq. That would

put the US and the UK on the front foot and the challenge was for the international

community and the UN. Mr Blair:

“… wanted the UN to meet that challenge, but if it could not we would have to act.

So we should remake the case, put together the evidence against Saddam, and

work up a UNSCR … [It] needed to be tough and unconditional so that – if Iraq

complied – it would change the way the regime operated. It was right to issue not an

ultimatum to the UN but a challenge to the international community.”

183. Mr Blair also said that, before that, what was needed was “a line to take” so that

“we were all answering the difficult questions in the same way”, including timing, the

nature of the challenge to the UN, and whether conflict was inevitable. He said that the

UN route “if pursued carefully was an opportunity, not an obstacle”.

64 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone Call with President Bush,

29 August’.

126