The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
which would
“demonstrate that this question has been the subject of
continuous
assessment
throughout the four years and has been brought to the regular
attention
of the
Government”.
326.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that he “hoped to be able to brief you further at JIC
on
11 September”
and that he “would particularly welcome your comments on
the
attachment”,
which set out key points from relevant JIC
Assessments.154
327.
Mr Scarlett
also sent the 10 September draft of the dossier to the members of
the
JIC on 11
September. Describing it as “very much work in progress”,
Mr Scarlett wrote:
“… several
sections … are already being rewritten. Nevertheless, you need to
see
where we
have got to. I would be grateful if you could study the
intelligence-related
sections …
and let me or Julian Miller have your views by mid-day tomorrow,
if
not at this
afternoon’s JIC. We particularly need advice on any remaining
security
implications
of publishing … We also need to be sure that overall the balance
of
the judgements
remains consistent with those previously reached by the
JIC.”155
328.
A member of
the DIS expressed concern about the reference in the draft to
Iraq
producing
an improvised nuclear device (IND).156
329.
The DIS
official wrote:
“As I
feared, the whole issue of Iraq considering the development of an
IND has
gained
momentum. I would like to delete all mention of INDs in the
dossier, but
the CO
[Cabinet Office] consider it vital to the picture for no sensible
reason.
Unfortunately
an Iraqi JIC paper referred to it (against DI52 advice) and
that
is being used
as a justification. This will probably grow as the dossier is
released
to the
press, with the result that the spotlight will be diverted from the
real, important
issues.
However, this does not concern the CO. If you have a chance to
advise CDI
[Chief of
Defence Intelligence] before this afternoon’s JIC, I would
appreciate your
support on
the removal of all mention of INDs …”
330.
The DIS
official stated that he had only agreed language saying that Iraq
would
not go
down this route.
331.
There is no
mention of INDs in the published version of the
dossier.
154
Minute
Scarlett to JIC Members, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public Presentation of
Intelligence material’ attaching
Draft
Paper, ‘Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Joint Intelligence
Committee Assessment’.
155
Minute
Scarlett to JIC Members, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Papers for
Public Presentation’.
156
Email
[1331] DIS [junior official] to DIS [junior official], 11 September
2002, ‘Non-existent Iraqi INDs’.
176