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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
which would “demonstrate that this question has been the subject of continuous
assessment throughout the four years and has been brought to the regular attention
of the Government”.
326.  Mr Scarlett wrote that he “hoped to be able to brief you further at JIC on
11 September” and that he “would particularly welcome your comments on the
attachment”, which set out key points from relevant JIC Assessments.154
327.  Mr Scarlett also sent the 10 September draft of the dossier to the members of the
JIC on 11 September. Describing it as “very much work in progress”, Mr Scarlett wrote:
“… several sections … are already being rewritten. Nevertheless, you need to see
where we have got to. I would be grateful if you could study the intelligence-related
sections … and let me or Julian Miller have your views by mid-day tomorrow, if
not at this afternoon’s JIC. We particularly need advice on any remaining security
implications of publishing … We also need to be sure that overall the balance of
the judgements remains consistent with those previously reached by the JIC.”155
328.  A member of the DIS expressed concern about the reference in the draft to Iraq
producing an improvised nuclear device (IND).156
329.  The DIS official wrote:
“As I feared, the whole issue of Iraq considering the development of an IND has
gained momentum. I would like to delete all mention of INDs in the dossier, but
the CO [Cabinet Office] consider it vital to the picture for no sensible reason.
Unfortunately an Iraqi JIC paper referred to it (against DI52 advice) and that
is being used as a justification. This will probably grow as the dossier is released
to the press, with the result that the spotlight will be diverted from the real, important
issues. However, this does not concern the CO. If you have a chance to advise CDI
[Chief of Defence Intelligence] before this afternoon’s JIC, I would appreciate your
support on the removal of all mention of INDs …”
330.  The DIS official stated that he had only agreed language saying that Iraq would
not go down this route.
331.  There is no mention of INDs in the published version of the dossier.
154  Minute Scarlett to JIC Members, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public Presentation of Intelligence material’ attaching
Draft Paper, ‘Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Joint Intelligence Committee Assessment’.
155  Minute Scarlett to JIC Members, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Papers for Public Presentation’.
156  Email [1331] DIS [junior official] to DIS [junior official], 11 September 2002, ‘Non-existent Iraqi INDs’.
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