The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

not exclude the time or circumstances where it becomes more important to regard

Basra as an objective in its own right … [A]nd I recognise the politics of the issue,

particularly if uprisings and humanitarian issues loom larger. But it is a dimension

which you might wish to cover with Rumsfeld to ensure that we do not create a

perception of drifting apart on the Baghdad/Basra priorities.”

317.  Sir Kevin’s comments on Phase IV are covered in Section 10.1.

318.  Mr Scarlett reported to the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 31 March that a suicide

car bomb at Najaf could be the start of a new aspect of Iraq’s defence, possibly using

terrorist organisations from outside Iraq.178

319.  Adm Boyce reported that the British Division was gaining increasing control in

the South.

320.  Following the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 31 March, a Cabinet Office official told

Sir David Manning that:

“There appears to be an increasing doctrinal difference between ourselves and

the Americans over our approach to dealing with the Iraqi towns and cities.

The Americans are very much in post 9/11 mode for dealing with the undecided:

if you are not for us then you must be against us. Our approach has been to

seduce … the undecided and encourage them to rise up. This is a message that

we will be trying to get across to the Americans on a variety of levels.” 179

321.  The official wrote that in Basra:

“We are now broadcasting into the city. The message has changed from … ‘stay

indoors and sit tight’ to … ‘get out and liberate yourselves from the regime’.”

322.  The Chiefs of Staff discussion of the need for decisions on the UK’s post-conflict

responsibilities is addressed later in this Section.

323.  During discussion of the military campaign in his conversation with

President Bush on 31 March, Mr Blair focused on the need to win the “propaganda

war”.

324.  Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice just after midday on 31 March.180 Sir David

reported that:

“There had been signs over the weekend, in the British sector in the South, that we

were beginning to win the confidence of the local population. This would take time

and care. But it was the key to unravelling Ba’ath party control. British forces on the

edge of Basra were choosing targets carefully and gradually inserting themselves

178  Minutes, 31 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

179  Minute Gibbons to Manning, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COS Meeting’.

180  Letter Manning to McDonald, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

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