The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
330.
Mr Straw told
Secretary Powell that he had discussed the position with Mr Blair
the
previous
day. Mr Straw explained that:
“The key
issue for the Prime Minister was whether the US wanted an
international
coalition
or not. The US could go it alone if they wanted that, they only had
to
tell us.”
331.
Mr Straw’s
view was:
“… that the
case for an international coalition was overwhelming: first for
basing
and access,
and then for what happened after getting rid of Saddam. But
also,
especially,
if things went wrong. In such circumstances the US would need
the
international
community at the scene of the crime …”
332.
Commenting on
the “day after”, Mr Straw pointed out that Iraq had been an
artificial
creation of
the UK in 1921. Iraq had “no experience of democracy and democracy
could
pull it
apart”.
333.
Secretary
Powell commented that: “Some of his colleagues did not want
UN
involvement
in any shape: it might frustrate their purpose.”
334.
The record of
the discussion was not to be seen by anyone other than
Sir David
Manning and Mr Blair.
335.
On 30 August,
Mr Blair set out his position on Iraq in a note to No.10
officials.191
He stated
that the basic strategy to deal with those arguing against any
action should be
to answer
their questions and, in doing so, to set Iraq in a bigger context.
That included
working on
a post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi regime:
“The
conundrum is: if it is merely changing Saddam for another military
dictator,
that hardly
elicits support from the rest of Iraq, especially the Shia
majority, and is
in any
event, not in line with our principles; on the other hand, if the
whole nature
of the
regime changes, the Sunni minority in power may be less tempted to
fold
and acquiesce
in Saddam’s removal. But there are ways through this.”
336.
Mr Blair’s
note is addressed in more detail in Section 3.4.
337.
In August
2002, DFID completed a review of its programme in northern
Iraq.
338.
The review,
which was not sent outside DFID, drew on a range of
sources
to present
as clear a picture as possible of the humanitarian situation
in
northern
Iraq.
191
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 30 August 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
168