The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
164.
The JIC
judged that disintegration of the regime would be most likely if
Iraqi
ground
forces were being comprehensively defeated; if top military
officers could
be
persuaded that their fate was not irrevocably tied to that of
Saddam Hussein;
or if
Saddam Hussein were to be killed.
165.
The JIC
assessed on 27 February 2002 (see Section 3.2) that the Iraqi
opposition
would be
unable to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime without direct
intervention on
the
ground.
166.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment of “how cohesion of
the
Iraqi
regime is maintained and how the regime would fare under pressure
or attack” on
167.
The minutes of
the JIC discussion of the draft paper described it as:
“… an
important paper with a specific focus. It would be of interest to
Ministers more
because of
its context, with decisions yet to be taken about what to do with
Iraq,
than
because of its analysis, which was familiar rather than
novel.
“Its key
message was that although Saddam Hussein’s regime was
remarkably
resilient
to pressure … the demonstration of a real and overwhelming
international
determination
and ability to remove the regime through military force was the
likeliest
way to
bring it down …
“Experience
in Afghanistan had shown that generating expectations and
influencing
people’s
perceptions of what might happen had considerable capacity to
effect real
and rapid
change …
“… the
paper needed to analyse … in more detail the nature of Saddam’s
support …
The motives
for each set of supporters were different … These mattered
because
under
pressure the different groups would behave
differently.
“UK policy
makers, and military planners, would be keen before too long to
identify
the point
at which self-interested loyalty for Saddam might turn into
disillusionment,
fragility
and fragmentation.”75
168.
The Key
Judgements from the Assessment are set out in the Box
below.76
Key
Judgements
“•
Only massive
military force would be guaranteed to topple Saddam. The
regime
expects a
US attack […]
74
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’.
75
Minutes, 3
July 2002, JIC meeting.
76
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’.
32