9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
443.
The minute
given to Mr Blair by his Private Secretary in preparation for
the
discussion
said:
“Some of
our Sunnis [sic] contacts have raised the possibility of
co-ordinated
cease-fires
in the run-up to the elections. We need
to be careful not to signal any
equivalence
between MNF/ISF activity on the one hand and the insurgency on
the
other. But
we should explore the
scope for local deals which would help draw in
those who
are close to the insurgency but politically
biddable”.207
444.
The Private
Secretary also suggested that the possibility of detainee
releases
should be
considered as part of the approach to Sunni outreach.
445.
A senior
government official specialising in the Middle East (1) wrote
on
25 November
with an update, and reported that:
“A senior
Sadrist close to Muqtada al-Sadr, who is a member of the Iraqi
nationalist
trend
opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq, has confirmed through a
UK-based
intermediary
that he is prepared to meet [one of the senior official’s
colleagues] in
either
[another location] or London … He may be able to act as a channel
from HMG
to al-Sadr
but could also shed light on the fractures within the Sadrist
movement.
I have
previously suggested the need for us to test out this channel if we
are to seek
to rely on
it in case of security need in MND(SE).”208
446.
On 25
November, Gen Walker wrote to Dr Reid with an outline of the main
issues
he had
identified during a visit to Iraq from 22 to 23
November.209
447.
Gen Walker
reported:
“Levels of
consent from MNF presence were slowly declining throughout
the
AOR [Area
of Operations]. When considering military activity in the AOR,
broadly
60 percent
of our effort was devoted to force protection and sustainment of
the
UK laydown,
30 percent to SSR [Security Sector Reform] and just five
percent
or so to UK
COIN [counter-insurgency].”
448.
Under the
heading “Where Are We?” Gen Walker reported that an Iraqi
insurgency
remained
active and was targeting the political process. The new
Constitution was
not viewed
as a national compact, although the majority of the Sunni
population was
committed
to the political process. The upcoming election and perceptions of
sectarian
conduct by
some Ministries were inhibiting progress.
207
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 22 November 2005, ‘VTC with President
Bush’.
208
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Asquith, 25 November 2005,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION] update II: [Plan] to influence the Electoral outcome in
Iraq’.
209
Minute CDS
to SofS [MOD], 25 November 2005, ‘CDS’s Visit to Iraq 22-23 Nov
05’.
563