9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
commented
that his presence in the South had been valuable, and that MND(SE)
was
already
seeing the benefit of him being back in Corps headquarters, where
he was
helpfully
ensuring that the MND(SE) perspective was better
understood.
42.
Having a
substantial US presence in MND(SE) had helped UK forces to
understand
how to work
with the US Corps system, but Maj Gen White-Spunner thought
that
MND(SE) was
still not articulating its requirements as fluently as other
divisions, and
still
failed to feature in many of the Corps daily statistics, which had
a direct bearing on
the
allocation of resources. He commented: “We are all learning
enthusiastically how
to speak
American, although the military dialect does take time to
master.”
43.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that the operation to clear Al Qurnah had
begun,
but that
many of the Special Groups they had hoped to detain had moved
on.
44.
A
scene-setting telegram from the British Embassy Office Basra on 18
May, prior
to a
visit by Mr Browne, assessed the city’s prospects as “on a
knife-edge” and judged:
“The Charge
of the Knights has to be consolidated. That will require an
energised
civil
society, with effective local government structures. It will need
to be Iraqi-led …
If momentum
can be maintained, and the militias kept out, Basra might just
make it.”12
45.
On 19 May, Lt
Gen Cooper reported that the cease-fire agreed on 10 May
appeared
to be
generally holding; it was not clear what the long-term impact would
be on the
Sadrist
movement.13
The
militias were in difficulty in Sadr City in Basra and
had
diminished
in Maysan and the other southern Provinces. But the cease-fire was
seen
as being on
the Government’s terms, and there was widespread criticism of
Muqtada
al‑Sadr’s
leadership. Lt Gen Cooper speculated that the Iraqi Government was
in
dialogue
with representatives of the Special Groups (“the lack of IDF in
recent days is
an indicator
of this”).
46.
Lt Gen Cooper
observed that as Prime Minister Maliki’s confidence and
control
grew, so
the influence of the coalition waned. He added:
“How we use
our remaining capital will be more and more important as
the
coalition’s
room for manoeuvre is increasingly constrained, and Maliki
continues
to build
a position very like that of the traditional Iraqi
strong-man.”
47.
On 22 May,
Iraqi Security Forces entered Sadr City at first light and met
almost no
resistance.14
They
secured key infrastructure locations, such as hospitals, and
found
45 weapons
caches.
12
eGram
19343/08 Basra to FCO London, 18 May 2008, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to Basra,
22 May:
Scene-Setter’.
13
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 19 May 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (301) 19 May
08’.
14
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 27 May 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (302) 27 May
08’.
389