3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
The Council
“had not made the best use of its time since adoption of
[resolution]
1441. In an
understandable wish to avoid war, colleagues had perhaps not
really
believed
the UK/US warnings: but we had taken a decision to put our need
for
long term
security over our wish to avoid war.”
1156.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had asked Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei a
series
of questions:
•
“How could
they be sure the interviewees were not being bugged
or threatened?”
•
“What real
chance was there of UNMOVIC resolving the mobile
biological
facilities
issues without Iraqi co-operation?”
•
“Was there
any evidence of Iraqi procurement and sites associated
with
this programme?”
•
What was
UNMOVIC’s “assessment of Iraq’s declaration in relation to
UAVs”?
1157.
Ambassador
Cunningham stated that the French and German proposals
assumed
Iraqi co-operation, but “it was hard, reading the UNMOVIC cluster
document,
to conclude
that verifiable disarmament could happen in the near future or was
ever
feasible”.
Iraq was “behaving now as it had always done”. Subsequently, he
stated
that if the
Council “spent the next 10 days dreaming about benchmarks it would
miss
its final
opportunity to secure a peaceful outcome”. The Council “could
assist by
bringing
maximum pressure to bear”; but since 20 January, “Baghdad had felt
under
no pressure”.
1158.
Mr de La
Sablière was reported to be “troubled that the Council’s timetable
was
being fixed
by the US military agenda, and by having to discuss the choice
between
war and
peace when inspections still offered a real chance of peaceful
disarmament”.
The
“clusters” document gave the Council an objective basis to address
the state of
Iraqi disarmament
and: “Only a few questions were left to be addressed: Iraq
was
‘largely
disarmed’ …” The inspectors “should list the priority issues to be
addressed and
the key
remaining disarmament tasks”.
1159.
Sir Jeremy
reported that:
•
Spain
questioned Mr de La Sablière’s comments and whether the
Council was
“really
being asked to believe that Saddam Hussein had complied fully
with
resolution 1441”.
•
Russia said
it was clear that, to avoid war the Council had to
continue
inspections.
It also asked whether any of the intelligence received had
helped
the
inspectors to find anything.
•
China said
the inspections were working and producing results; they
should
continue.
The draft resolution would “strangle the 1441 system in its
infancy”.
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