3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
606.
Mr Straw
also wrote that the special Ministerial meeting of the Security
Council,
and the
three that followed in a seven‑week period, were “among the most
serious and
dramatic
meetings in which I have ever been involved”.
607.
President
Bush stated on 21 January that it was clear Saddam Hussein
was
not
disarming and time was running out.
608.
Sir David
Manning was assured by Dr Rice that the US wanted a
second
resolution.
609.
In a press
conference following a meeting with leading economists at the
White
House on 21
January, President Bush was asked if he was frustrated by the
French
“saying
that they would block a UN resolution authorizing force on Iraq”.
He replied
that Saddam
Hussein possessed “some of the world’s deadliest weapons” and
posed
“a serious
threat to America and our friends and allies”. The world, including
France, had
come
together “to say he must disarm”. But he was “not disarming”, he
was “delaying …
deceiving …
asking for time”. He was “playing hide‑and‑seek with the
inspectors”.
The US
“in the name of peace” would “continue to insist” that he did
disarm.206
610.
Asked when he
intended to take a decision about whether the inspection
process
had any
real hope of disarming Saddam, President Bush replied:
“It’s clear
to me now that he is not disarming … Surely we have learned how
this
man
deceives and delays. He’s giving people the run‑around … time is
running
out …
Make no mistake … he will be disarmed.”
611.
President Bush
concluded that Saddam Hussein had:
“… been
given ample time to disarm. We have had ample time now to see that
…
he’s
employing the tricks of the past …
“He wants
to focus the attention of the world on inspectors. This is not
about
inspectors;
this is about a disarmed Iraq …
“… this
looks like a rerun of a bad movie and I’m not interested in
watching it.”
612.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that President Bush’s remarks were a
“clear
message
that [the US was] losing patience with the UN, and they had pretty
much
decided it
was going to happen and that was that”. Mr Blair “felt there
had definitely been
a change in
mood and it was pretty bad”; President Bush needed to do more to
make it
an
international coalition.207
206
The White
House Press Release, 21 January 2003, President
Meets with Leading Economists.
207
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
107