4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
•
Any of the
380 SA-2 engines imported in contravention of resolution 687
and
converted
for use in the Al Samoud missile system were also
proscribed.
•
The casting
chambers for missile motors which had been destroyed
by
UNSCOM and
reconstituted were also proscribed.
•
Clarifications
were needed before decisions could be made on the
capabilities
of the
Al Fatah missile and the engine test stand at
al-Rafah.
317.
Addressing the
role of intelligence, Dr Blix stated that in the closed society of
Iraq,
and given
the history of inspections, “other sources of information, such as
defectors
and
government intelligence agencies” were “required to aid the
inspection process”.
International
organisations then needed to analyse such information
critically.
318.
Dr Blix added
that intelligence had been useful for UNMOVIC, and in one case
had
led to the
discovery of documents relating to laser enrichment of
uranium:
“In other
cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items
were
found. Even
in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful
in
proving the
absence of such items and in some cases the presence of
other
items –
conventional munitions. It shows that conventional arms are being
moved
around the
country and their presence is not necessarily related to weapons
of
mass destruction.”
319.
Dr Blix also
pointed out that the evidence that Iraq had prepared for
inspections
by cleaning
up sites and removing evidence, presented to the Security Council
by
Secretary
Powell on 5 February, could have a different
interpretation.
320.
Dr
ElBaradei reported that the IAEA had found no evidence of
ongoing
prohibited
nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq, although a number
of
issues were
still under investigation.
321.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that Iraq had provided documentation relating to
the
reported
attempt to import uranium, the attempted procurement of aluminium
tubes,
the
procurement of magnets and magnet production capability, and the
use of HMX.
The IAEA:
•
was
pursuing the acquisition of uranium;
•
examining
issues in relation to aluminium tubes and magnets; and
•
might be
unable to reach a final conclusion on HMX: “While we have
no
indication
that this material was used for any application other than declared
by
Iraq, we
have no technical method of verifying … the declared use
…”
322.
In relation to
“documents found on 16 January in the private residence of an
Iraqi
scientist”,
the IAEA had “completed a more detailed review”. The documents
related
“predominantly
to lasers, including the use of laser technology to enrich
uranium”.
“Nothing”
in the documents altered “the conclusions previously drawn by the
IAEA”
about the
extent of Iraq’s laser enrichment programme.
351