12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
“re‑organising
the ‘local policing’ resources to deliver effective crime
prevention,
investigation
and community policing”.
1415.
ACC Colbourne
wrote that developing the Emergency Battalions would be
“the
most
demanding aspect of this support”. He had agreed with
Maj Gen Jalil that his team
would
complete the current training of his officers at Shaibah in
addition to generating
an Iraqi
training team. He planned for the six existing ArmorGroup IPAs to
put that team
in place,
capable of delivering the Emergency Battalion syllabus, by early
December.
It had been
agreed that all other Basra‑based ArmorGroup contractors would end
their
missions by
the end of November. ACC Colbourne stated that “the sheer scale of
the
training”
required a “bigger and more permanent” solution.
1416.
ACC Colbourne
wrote that the Emergency Battalions would be “instrumental”
in
enabling
Maj Gen Jalil to “engage the militias” and “hold ground”.
Once achieved, he
wrote that
there would “be an urgent need to reposition the ‘miltaristic’
policing style
which will
be dominant in Basra, to a more community focused local policing
approach”.
1417.
The House of
Commons Defence Committee had published a report on
3 December
2007, following a visit to Iraq from 8 to 11 July.1298
1418.
Reporting on
the Committee’s visit to Basra, Mr Asquith said that in
response to
being asked
about the current security situation in the city and the likely
consequences
of a UK
withdrawal within 12 months:
“The
Basrawis were clear: services and reconstruction were improving but
the
main
problem was that the ISF were under‑funded, unqualified and
security was
deteriorating.
The British Government had promised a lot when it liberated
Iraq,
but had not
delivered. Militias were more of a concern than criminal gangs.
The
provincial
authorities were not able to confront the militias because the
security
forces owed
their loyalty to political parties rather than the State … Pulling
no
punches,
they said a British withdrawal would ‘be followed by chaos
sweeping
the province
like a hurricane’.”1299
1419.
The
Committee’s report concluded:
“Despite
its increasing capability, the Iraqi Army in South Eastern Iraq
still requires
the support
of UK Forces, particularly in logistics and intelligence
…
“… The
Police would seem to have a long way to go in becoming truly
effective and
in gaining
the trust of the population. Given the scale of the problems which
still
need to be
tackled, there would seem to be a need for an ongoing commitment
by
the UK to
training and mentoring the Iraqi Police.”1300
1298
First
report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2007‑08, UK Land
Operations
in Iraq
2007, HC
110.
1299
eGram
30010/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Visit of House
of Commons Defence
Committee,
8‑11 July’.
1300
First
report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2007‑08, UK Land
Operations
in Iraq
2007, HC
110.
383