The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Intelligence
Capability: the Collections, Collation, Analysis, Action
and
Dissemination
of Intelligence – criminal, terrorist and
counter‑insurgency;
•
Operational
Capability: Police to have effective Command and Control
Systems
with aim of
Policy Primacy; Co‑Ordination; Specialist Support SWAT
[Special
Weapons and
Tactics] and TSU [Tactical Support Unit]; Criminal
Investigation
(inc.
Forensic); and
•
Public
Support: Development of Police interaction with the Criminal
Justice
System
(Courts, Prisons etc), Media and Public; Development of Public
and
Civil
Accountability; Ability to remove corrupt and inefficient police
officers
through a
robust, transparent and accountable Complaints System
(Professional
716.
The report
also analysed the UK resource requirement to meet those priorities
and
sought to
identify any gaps. DCC Smith commented that, while he knew how many
UK
personnel
were currently working on policing in Iraq, he was:
“…
unsighted on … the overall ‘staffing’ allocation or budget for
Iraq. There is no
clear
indication of the number of posts that are budgeted by the FCO
either in
Baghdad or
Basra … This is not a personal failing on any department but
reflects
a sometimes
unstructured approach.”
717.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Former ACC Smith wrote that, although
those five
areas
became “the focus of successive plans”, the strategy itself “did
not become, in the
long run,
the driver in MND(SE)”.655
He
wrote:
“Why?
Perhaps lack of adequate consultation and explanation with the
military,
possibly
the changing situation on the ground or the military expectation
that as
the main
provider of resources etc they had the better understanding of the
issues.
Attempts to
support a strategic aim of ‘developing an efficient, effective,
credible
and
community‑based accountable police service’ rapidly became subsumed
within
military
operational and logistical plans …
“In the
absence of an agreed strategy, plans were driven on the ground
by
successive
six month military and staff rotations and changes in security
and
political expectations.”
718.
On 10 June,
DFID commissioned a consultant to “assist the FCO in
drawing
together a
cross‑Whitehall strategy for UK support to the development of Iraqi
policing
capacity”.656
The Terms
of Reference for the strategy stated that UK support needed
“a
more
strategic focus” and that FCO’s draft strategy now needed to be
“expanded and
amended by
inputs from the various department specialists”. The strategy
should be
completed
by 17 June.
654
Report
Barton, August 2006, ‘The window of opportunity’.
655
Statement,
14 June 2010, pages 2‑3.
656
Letter DFID
[junior official] to [Consultant], 10 June 2005, ‘Cross‑Whitehall
Strategy for UK support
to Iraqi
Policing’.
216