15.1 | Civilian personnel

533. The Locally Engaged Staff Assistance Scheme is addressed later in this Section.

534. Section 9.6 describes the changes brought about by the Charge of the Knights,

the Iraqi military operation in March 2008 to drive Shia militias out of Basra.

535. Mr Keith MacKiggan, Head of the Basra PRT from the end of September 2008,

was one of several witnesses to describe the operation’s impact:

“… post‑Charge of the Knights, really the only constraint on our movement around

the city and the wider province was the availability of military assets … over time,

even that became less of a constraint.” 351

536. The FCO SOSA visited Baghdad with a DFID security co‑ordinator and a

second FCO official from 15 to 18 October 2008.352 He reported that there had been

a dramatic reduction in terrorist incidents after the US surge, but that the threat to

civilian staff remained as before. Of particular concern was the use of the Improvised

Rocket Assisted Mortar (IRAM), which was more effective and accurate than IDF from

long range.

537. The SOSA advised that CRG was at the limit of its capacity. It was supporting

120 civilian staff with numbers intended for 80. If there was an increase in UK civilian

staff or a change in security requirements because the US decided to withdraw from

checkpoints in the International Zone as part of the transition to Iraqi security control,

GRG assets would need to increase.

538. After visiting Basra from 19 to 21 October, the SOSA advised that the surge had

led to a significant reduction in terrorist incidents, but that the threat to staff remained

unchanged.353 He highlighted the threat of IED and IDF attacks and the “high possibility

of kidnap”.

539. The visit raised concerns about the condition of DFID and FCO vehicles in

Baghdad and Basra.354 The inspectors recommended regular spot checks and the

installation of additional security equipment.

540. During October, the FCO and DFID reverted to local authorisation by the

Consul General and the DFID Head of the Basra PRT of moves outside the COB.355

All moves had been authorised from London since the deterioration of the security

situation in 2005.

351 Public hearing, 7 January 2010, page 10.

352 Letter SOSA to Prentice, 6 November 2008, ‘Visit to Baghdad’.

353 Letter SOSA to Haywood, 7 November 2008, ‘Visit to Basra’.

354 Minute Middle East and North Africa Department [junior official] to Brown, 6 November 2008, ‘Back to

Office Report – Iraq Security Review’.

355 Minute Middle East and North Africa Department [junior official] to Lowcock, 13 October 2008, ‘Iraq:

Movements Approval’.

339