The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
451.
Mr Blair
said that he wanted to see more progress on the delivery of better
media
output by
the Iraqi network. Overall, he believed that the security situation
could be
turned
around. The key to this was to deal with the Sunni triangle, where
political
disaffection
generated support for those acting against the Coalition. He
invited Mr Straw
to draw up
a strategy to tackle this urgently.
452.
The IPU paper
on political process said that the “Bremer plan” remained the
best
way
forward.258
That view
was shared in Baghdad.
453.
IPU also
reported that it remained likely that the GC would opt for
elections to
the
Constitution Convention, resulting in a period of Occupation
lasting two and a half
years.
Mr Annan was supporting a French/German proposal to create a
provisional
government,
under a UN lead.
454.
The IPU set
out a new approach which inserted an interim
“provisional
government”
to act as the repository of Iraqi sovereignty until the
constitutional process
was
complete and an elected Iraqi Government in place, “modifying the
Bremer plan,
rather than
redesigning it”.
455.
IPU suggested
that a provisional government might be formed by either
bringing
together
the GC, ministers and the CPC or through “rough and ready”
elections; or by a
mixture of
the two.
456.
The paper
asked members of DOP:
“… to agree
that we should work to speed up the transfer of power to
Iraqis;
continue to
work for a central UN role based on partnership; keep open that
this
process
might make it possible to move to a Provisional Government once
certain
conditions
are met; that we should explore such an approach with the US,
if
developments
on the constitutional process dictate a change of
tack.”
457.
The minutes of
DOP’s discussion show that Mr Blair concluded:
“The
timetable conceived by the Bremer plan would deliver elections for
a
representative
government in Iraq by this time next year. He looked forward
to
further
advice on discussions between the Coalition Provisional Authority
and the
Governing
Council about the handling of the political process in order to
create
greater
stability in Iraq by next spring.”259
458.
On 9 October,
Sir Hilary Synnott reported to the FCO that:
“All
observers close to the scene here detect markedly improved
attitudes
throughout
the South over the last three months … The overriding
impression,
backed by
some firm evidence, is that the general population and its
leadership have
decided to
give the Coalition the benefit of the doubt and thus to co-operate
with us
and to
discourage opposition …
258
Paper IPU,
7 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.
259
Minutes, 9
October 2003, DOP meeting.
282