3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
“… We
believed Saddam’s weakness was that he loved power and would
do
anything to
keep it. If we could convince him that we were serious about
removing
his regime,
there was a chance he would give up his WMD … The odds of
success
were long.
But given the alternative it was worth the effort. The approach was
called
coercive
diplomacy.
“Coercive
diplomacy with Iraq consisted of two tracks: One was to rally a
coalition
of nations
to make clear that Saddam’s defiance of his international
obligations was
unacceptable.
The other was to develop a credible military option that could be
used
if he
failed to comply. These tracks would run parallel at first. As the
military option
grew more
visible and more advanced, the tracks would converge. Our
maximum
leverage
would come just before they intersected. That would be the moment
of
decision.
And ultimately, it would be Saddam Hussein’s decision to
make.”136
434.
President Bush
wrote that Mr Blair had been “pleased when I told him that
I
was
planning to ask the UN for the resolution”, and that Mr Blair
had replied: “Many
opponents
wish we would just be unilateral – then they could complain … But
you are
calling
their bluff.”
435.
President Bush
added:
“We both
understood what the decision meant. Once we laid out our position
at
the UN, we
had to be willing to follow through with the consequences. If
diplomacy
failed,
there would be only one option left. ‘I don’t want to go to war,’ I
told Tony, ‘but
I will do
it’.
“Tony
agreed.”
436.
Vice
President Cheney wrote that President Bush wanted to
support
Mr Blair’s
position; but he also expressed scepticism about the utility
of
inspections
in achieving the US objectives.
437.
Vice President
Cheney wrote that in the meeting with Mr Blair they had
talked
through the
need for UN involvement:
“Blair was
tough. He understood the stakes and the importance of acting
against
Saddam, and
he was clear that he would be with us no matter what – and that
was
likely to
include strong opposition from within his own party.
“Blair
argued that a UN resolution was necessary to achieve maximum
international
cooperation.
He was very persuasive, and I understood that the President
wanted
to support
his friend. There was no legal obligation for us to pursue a
resolution, but
there were
some in the United States and many more in Europe who felt it
would
legitimize
military action, and a resolution would also speak to their
concerns. The
President
told the Prime Minister he would go forward with a
resolution.
136
Bush
GW. Decision
Points.
Virgin Books,
2010.
167